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Sponsors are known as entities that originate the REIT by contributing an initial 
portfolio of properties into the REIT. Unique “captive” management structures 
and concentrated equity holdings by sponsors in Asia mean that sponsors are 
highly influential over the management of their REIT. Recent reports by 
RiskMetrics (2009) and CFA (2011) have highlighted concerns over dominant 
sponsors extracting private benefits from their REITs via inequitable related 
transactions. The main objectives of this study are to (1) identify the determinants 
of sponsor holdings and (2) examine whether larger sponsor holdings can serve to 
align the interest of sponsors and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Empirically, I report that developer and government linked sponsors retain largest 
shareholdings. I further document a positive significant relation between sponsor 
holdings and firm value (Tobin’s Q) that is strictly linear across different 
empirical models. More committed sponsors are deterred from consuming 
perquisites as their wealth is increasingly tied to the REIT. Stronger monitoring 
from more committed institutional investors and powerful boards further enhance 
firm value. Additional test reveals that the nature of sponsors matter. Specifically, 
REITs backed by developers and banks are more highly valued and incentive 
alignment effects are much greater surrounding developer sponsors. A 
comparison of various financial ratios stratified according to sponsor type and 
ownership levels further reveals that bank and developer sponsors confer 
financing and operational benefits respectively to their REITs, leading to higher 
firm valuation.  
Keywords: Asian REITs ∙ Sponsors ∙ Corporate Governance ∙ Ownership 
structure ∙ Firm Value ∙ Related party transactions 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and motivation 
Many corporations today are run by people who do not necessarily own 
the firms they managed. The separation of ownership and control exacerbates 
agency problems (Berle and Means, 1932) as managers can act against the interest 
of shareholders, either through empire building (Jensen, 1986) or consumption of 
perquisites (Morck et al., 1988). Equity ownership held by managers has been 
identified to mitigate such agency concerns as larger managerial ownership aligns 
the interest of managers and external shareholders, with the managers’ personal 
wealth increasingly tied to firm performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Larger managerial shareholdings, however, may have unintended effects 
on firm performance as they can confer managers’ stronger voting rights to resist 
disciplinary actions from both shareholders and corporate market, and to indulge 
in non-profitable activities that maximize personal wealth (Stulz, 1988; Morck et 
al. 1988). Another school of thought is that managerial shareholdings should have 
no relationship with firm performance as both managerial holdings and firm 
performance are endogenously determined by changes in the firm’s contracting 
environment (Demsetz and Lehn, 1983; 1985). Any relationship detected between 
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sponsor shareholdings and firm performance is likely to be fraught with 
endogeneity issue. Thus, the relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance remains an empirical puzzle. 
Scholars focus their research between managerial ownership and firm 
performance on US Real Estate Investment Trust (REITs) on the basis that REITs 
are more prone to agency issues due to unique regulations (Friday et al., 1999; 
Han, 2006) or weaker disciplining mechanisms from corporate market (Ghosh 
and Sirmans, 2003; Hartzel et al, 2006). Agency issues are, in fact, more prevalent 
in Asian REITs market. The main reason is that most of the Asian REITs, unlike 
the US REITs, are structured as “Captive” REITs in which the REIT is managed 
by an external asset management company that is wholly or partially owned by 
the sponsor (See Figure 1 for details). Sponsors are known as entities that 
originate the REITs by divesting investment-grade real estate into the REIT. This 
organizational structure means that sponsors can dictate investment and financing 
decisions of their REITs. Furthermore, concentrated REIT shareholdings held by 
sponsors post IPO further reduces any hostile takeover threats and give sponsors 
considerable voting rights to influence decision making. A typical Asian sponsor 
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retains about 23.7% of the REIT shareholdings, much larger than 16.2% held by 
US REIT managers
1
. (Figure 2) 
[Figure 1] 
[Figure 2] 
Agency concerns are further exacerbated by frequent related party 
property transactions
2
 (RPTs) between sponsors and their REITs post IPO (Ooi, 
Ong and Neo, 2011). Sponsors, who own and control REIT advisors, act as both 
sellers and buyers in these transactions, raising concerns over the price paid and 
quality
3  
of such transactions. Such concerns are not unfounded given how 
widespread expropriations are documented across REITs in Asia (CFA, 2011; 
RiskMetrics, 2009). Expropriations can arise from disposing overvalued 
properties or acquiring undervalued properties from their REITs (Fortune REIT, 
FC Residential Investment Corporation, Keppel REIT), or from conducting 
financing activities favorable to sponsors (MacArthurCook REIT, Mori Hills 
REIT). (See details in Table 1). REIT managers also have strong incentives to 
                                                          
1 Figures obtained from Han (2006).  
2 In their study on property transactions made by Japan and Singapore REITs from 2002 to 2007, 
Ooi et al. (2011) observe that almost one third of all the property transactions are related party 
acquisitions with their sponsors. 
3 Sponsors also have a tendency to keep their “trophy assets” in their portfolio while disposing 
smaller properties into the REITs. In their research report, RREEF (2012) illustrate that J-REIT 
sponsors tend to only feed smaller properties into their REITs. While the average total assets hold 
by J-REITs is approximately JPY 111 billion in 2011, about 50 buildings alone in Japan are worth 
as much as the entire REIT portfolio. 
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overpay for acquisitions given that they are compensated based on percentage of 
both their assets under management (AUM) and the amount of property 
acquisitions and dispositions. This phenomenon is empirically supported by 
Capozza and Seguin (2000) who report that external REIT advisors are inclined to 
use expensive debt incessantly to grow aggressively, leading to the 
underperformance of externally managed REITs (Hsieh and Sirmans, 1991; 
Cannon and Vogt, 1995).  
[Table 1] 
A competing view is that backing from sponsors can confer benefits to 
REITs. Having strong ties with sponsors ensure better growth opportunities as 
sponsors provide a pipeline of properties for acquisitions. Sponsors also provide 
certification of their REIT IPO by retaining large proportion of equity holdings of 
their REIT during IPO (Wong et al., 2011). Investment opportunities from 
sponsors are particularly valuable, given how saturated the asset market is in Asia 
due to the aggressive acquisition strategies adopted by many REITs (Ooi et al., 
2011). Management expertise from developer sponsors further enhances the 
operating performance for REITs, reducing operating expenses and vacancy risks. 
Backing from bank sponsors can further mitigate refinancing risk that has affected 
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Asian REITs during global financial crisis by facilitating bank borrowings. Given 
the conflicting perspectives surrounding the influence from sponsors, it remains 
unclear whether sponsors create or destroy shareholder wealth. 
While the management and organizational structures of REITs are very 
similar across the different countries in Asia, minor differences are observed in 
the legislations of the different countries (See Table 2). Specifically, REITs in 
Japan has the lowest risk of hostile takeovers due to the large requirements on 
voting rights for the approval. Most of the Asian REITs faced stringent measures 
on related party transactions with their sponsors. The only exception is REITs in 
Japan as they do not require approvals from independent unitholders or board of 
directors for transactions with interested parties. Surrounding board structures, 
REITs in Hong Kong are not required to create formal boards if externally 
managed. While Malaysian REITs have the greatest flexibility in terms of asset 
restrictions, REITs in Hong Kong must strictly invest in real estate. These 
differences in regulatory framework are likely to influence both sponsor 





The current stream of literature is predominantly conducted in US REIT 
market. Studies conducted on the Asian REIT market is surprisingly limited 
despite the prevalence of governance issues reflected in CFA (2011). Kudus and 
Sing (2011) and Lecomte and Ooi (2012) have examined the impact of corporate 
governance on firm performance in Asian REITs. However, the 
representativeness of these studies is questioned given that these studies are 
fraught with data availability issues or are either conducted only on a single REIT 
market.  
 
1.2 Research questions  
 
With the widespread of governance issues in the Asian REIT market, the 
contentious relationship between the sponsors and their REITs and the limited 
literature surrounding corporate ownership and governance structures in Asian 
REITs, it is imperative to examine the impact of sponsors on REIT firm value and 
the effectiveness of alternate governance structures in mitigating possible agency 
problems. While the bulk of the literature has been conducted on the US REITs 
market, the applicability of such studies on Asian REITs market is questionable 
due to the stark differences in governance, ownership, and management structures 
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and legislation framework. To bridge this gap in the literature, this paper seeks to 
examine the following research questions: 
The first research question seeks to identify the determinants for Sponsor 
ownership in REITs in Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia and Singapore. An 
interesting observation on Asian REITs is that sponsors tend to retain large 
shareholdings post IPO, though shareholdings appear to vary greatly across 
different sponsors and REITs. The key interest of this paper is to identify the 
characteristics that influence the sponsors’ retention of equity holdings. 
Specifically, I investigate whether sponsor shareholdings vary across different 
types of sponsors (like developer sponsor, bank sponsor and government linked 
sponsor) and whether shareholdings are influenced by the number of REIT spin-
offs made by sponsors. I further specify controls for the scope of moral hazard 
(firm specific variables and alternate governance mechanisms) that can influence 
the optimum ownership structure in the spirit of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and 
Himmelberg et al (1999).  
The second research question seeks to ascertain the impact of sponsor 
ownership on REIT firm value (Tobin’s Q). Aware of the monitoring effects from 
other governance mechanisms (Agarwal et al, 1996), I adopt a robust framework 
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by controlling for board structures, external block holders, debt holders and 
institutional shareholdings. Such robust controls not only avoid omitted variable 
bias problem in the specifications, but also establish an understanding on the 
effectiveness of governance structures in mitigating moral hazard problems. I 
further contribute to the literature by considering whether the nature of the 
sponsors can influence the relationship between sponsor holdings and firm value 
by stratifying regression analysis according to the type of sponsors and 
controlling for the sponsor-specific characteristics. To mitigate concerns of the 
endogeneity problem between ownership structures and performance (Demsetz 
and Lehn, 1985), I also estimate the relationship between ownership and firm 
value using GMM (Generalized Methods of Moment). 
 
1.3 Preliminary findings 
 
Surrounding the first research question, I find that sponsor characteristics 
influence how much REIT shareholdings sponsors decide to retain. In particular, I 
find that on average developer sponsors hold 9.5% more shares than non-bank 
and non-developer sponsors holding all things constant. Higher retention of shares 
could be driven by their desire to dictate investment decisions of their spun-off 
16 
 
REITs, given that developer sponsors conduct frequent property transactions with 
their REITs post IPO.  
On average, I observe that financially strong bank sponsors retain 5.3% 
more shares than other non-bank and non-developer sponsor while government 
linked sponsors hold 10.4% more shares than non-government linked sponsors. 
Government linked sponsors concentrated holdings could be explained by the 
compatibility of REITs risk and return profile to government owned enterprises’ 
requirements. Optimal sponsor holdings in REITs are also reduced by stronger 
presence of alternate governance mechanisms, as reflected by larger institutional 
and external block owner shareholdings, higher debt ratios (strong debt holder 
monitoring) and stronger boards (more independent and larger boards).  
Surrounding the second research question, the empirical findings reveal a 
positive and significant relationship between sponsor holdings and REIT firm 
value. Specifically, 1% increase in sponsor holdings increases Tobin’s Q by 0.192. 
Larger equity holdings appear to align the objectives of shareholders and sponsors, 
inducing sponsors to pursue corporate decisions that enhance shareholder wealth. 




Alternate governance mechanisms appear to enhance REIT firm value as 
REITs with stronger monitoring from institutional investors and board of directors 
are more highly valued. Piecewise regressions further indicate that such incentive 
alignment effects are only documented at relatively low levels of sponsor 
holdings from 0 to 5% and diminish at higher sponsor holdings. This relationship 
remains strictly linear even after I control for sponsor related characteristics and 
stratify the regressions at country level.   
I further stratified the regressions according to the nature of the sponsors 
(developers, banks and others) and document some interesting observations. 
Firstly, the magnitude of incentive alignment effects differs across sponsors. 
Notably, such effects are much strongest surrounding developer sponsors, 
suggesting that their real estate expertise or by conferring superior growth 
opportunities can create shareholder wealth. Bank sponsored REITs with larger 
sponsor shareholdings are also more highly valued, suggesting that banking 
relationships can also enhance firm value, probably through procuring of 
financing at favorable terms. A comparison of various financial ratios stratified 
according to sponsor type and ownership levels further reveals that bank and 
developer sponsors confer financing and operational benefits respectively to their 
REITs, leading to higher firm valuation.  
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1.4 Research contributions 
 
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. This paper is 
the pioneer research conducted in the REIT context to understand the 
determinants for the corporate ownership in REITs. The Asian REIT story is in 
many ways more interesting than that in US given its unique management 
structure and its high concentration of sponsor holdings. The unprecedented 
concentration is also a puzzling fact because conventional finance literature 
hypothesizes that REITs should have lower insider holdings due to ease of 
monitoring and lesser agency problems
4
.  
The relationship of governance structures and sponsor on firm 
performance is an important one in Asian REIT context given the widespread of 
expropriation by sponsors on their REITs as documented in CFA (2011). It 
remains a puzzle whether the presence of alternate governance mechanisms and 
higher sponsor shareholdings can reduce the propensity of expropriation. This 
study addresses the empirical puzzle and findings from this study can potentially 
have policy implications. 
                                                          
4
 High cash payout ratios for tax exemption status mean that REITs have very low retention of 
cash that reduces the propensity of managers to misuse free cash, thus mitigating agency concerns. 
Moreover, it is easier for investors to monitor managers because it is easier to value REITs given 
the large proportion of tangible assets as bulk of the REIT assets are properties. 
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While most of the previous studies have directly investigated the 
relationship between ownership and firm performance, I extend the literature by 
bringing in sponsor related characteristics into the equation. In this way, I can 
address whether the relationship between sponsor shareholdings and firm value is 
affected by the type of sponsors (developer, bank and government-linked 
sponsors) and the sponsor related characteristics (sponsor reputation, number of 
spin offs).  
Data availability has always been an issue in studies conducted in Asia. 
Data on corporate ownership and governance structures in Asian REITs are often 
not available or fairly limited due to the short history. This study examines a more 
extensive dataset, not only covering more Asian REIT markets, but also studying 
a longer time period (2002 -2011).  
 
1.5 Structure of paper 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review 
on the literature on corporate ownership structure, specifically on its determinants 
and its influence on firm value. Chapter 3 entails the data, empirical models, 
research methodology employed in this study. Chapter 4 illustrates the empirical 
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results for the paper. Chapter 5 concludes by reiterating the intended contributions 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
This chapter entails a broad summary of relevant literature surrounding 
corporate ownership, governance structures and performance. The first section 
illustrates the important determinants of insider ownership structures in firms. The 
second section illustrates the relationship between insider ownership and various 
measures of firm performance. Finally, I conclude this section by identifying the 
gaps in the literature and discussion how this study attempts to bridge these gaps. 
I rely heavily on the general finance literature due to the limited studies conducted 
in the REIT literature. 
  
2.1 Determinants of Corporate Ownership 
 
2.1.1 Finance Literature 
Majority of the studies examining determinants of ownership structures in 
firms concur that managerial shareholdings are optimally determined by the firm 
specific characteristics. This idea is first proposed by Demsetz and Lehn (1983; 
1985). The general consensus amongst these studies is that larger managerial 
shareholdings can align the interest between managers and external shareholders 
and attenuate agency problems. Therefore, optimum managerial holdings 
should effectively increase with (1) the magnitude of agency problems, (2) the 
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difficulty in monitoring the firm, (3) managerial preferences and capacity 
and (4) the weakness of legislation in protecting property rights.    
The difficulty in monitoring the firm increases with the instability of the 
firm, as reflected by volatile stock performance (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; 
Himmelberg et al., 1999). The higher proportion of intangible capital in a firm 
(Himmelberg et al., 1999), the more arduous it is for shareholders to monitor 
managerial performance because it is harder for shareholders to value the 
company. Therefore, larger managerial shareholdings are required to reduce the 
need for shareholders to monitor closely. Consistent with their predictions, 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) document that managerial ownership is lower in firms 
with less intangible capital. Similarly, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find that firms 
with more stable stock price and accounting profits have lower managerial 
holdings. 
Firms with stronger governance mechanisms are easier to monitor due to 
the delegation of monitoring to alternate governance mechanisms. As such, strong 
corporate governance mechanisms can reduce the optimal managerial 
shareholdings as the moral hazard problems are mitigated in well governed firms. 
On this notion, the presence of strong governance mechanisms like larger 
institutional shareholdings and block holdings, stronger boards and stronger 
presence of debt holders (higher debt ratios) should correlate with lower 
managerial ownership (Agarwal and Knoeber, 1996; Denis and Sarin, 1999). 
However, empirical findings are often weak as most of these studies have low 
goodness of fit with many insignificant variables (See Agarwal and Knoeber, 
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1996; Mak and Li, 2001). This could be due to the fact that corporate ownership 
often remains static over time (Denis and Sarin, 1996). Nonetheless, Denis and 
Sarin (1996) find that more independent boards and stronger monitoring from 
debt holders leads to lower managerial holdings.  
Agency problems are more prevalent in firms with larger discretionary 
spending and free cash flow (Himmelberg et al., 1999) as managers have greater 
opportunities to consume private benefits at the expense of shareholders (Jensen, 
1986). Therefore, higher managerial ownership is required to align the aims of 
managers with shareholders. Agency problems are mitigated in more regulated 
industries (financial and utility) as legislations provide disciplining mechanisms 
to monitor and penalize misbehaving managers (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). These 
predictions are empirically supported as more regulated firms from financial and 
utility industries (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) and firms with lower discretionary 
spending (Himmelberg et al., 1999) have lower managerial holdings when 
compared to other firms.  
The desire of managers to hold more shares can be influenced by the firm 
size, the threat of takeover and profitability of the firm. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
hypothesize that as the size of the firm increases, it becomes more expensive for 
managers to hold a given fraction of the firm. Given that risk is less diversified 
with a larger proportion of wealth tied to performance of the managing firm, risk 
averse managers will hold fewer shares (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). 
Therefore, managerial holdings should reduce with firm size. Indeed, many 
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studies have reported that larger firms have more diffused ownership structures 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Denis and Sarin, 1996; Himmelberg et al. 1999).  
In addition, managers have the desire to increase their holdings as a 
response to takeover threat (Dann and DeAngelo, 1988; Denis and Sarin, 1999) as 
larger managerial holdings reduce the probability that a hostile takeover will be 
successful. It is also empirically proven that founding managers (Denis and Sarin, 
1999) and longer serving managers (Agarwal and Knoeber, 1996) tend to hold 
more shares on their firms, indicating that the managers’ affection for the 
company can induce them to hold more shares. 
Firms that are performing well may experience a spike in the managerial 
ownership levels as managers are keener to exercise their executive stock options, 
thereby increasing the managerial holdings (Agarwal and Knoeber, 1996; Denis 
and Sarin, 1999). Consistent with their predictions, better performing firms as 
captured by higher firm value have larger managerial holdings (Kole, 1994; Cho, 
1998). These findings raise concerns about the reverse causality between 
ownership structure and performance. 
Comparing firms across different countries, La Porta et al (1999) and 
Claessens and Fan (2002) report that ownership is most concentrated in countries 
with the weakest legal and institutional environment. In these countries, managers 
are required to make use of their larger equity positions to give them power 
(stronger voting rights) and incentives (cash flow rights) to exercise their rights, 
given the incapacity of the legal environment to do so. 
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2.1.2 REIT Literature 
Considerable lesser attention has been paid in explaining the corporate 
ownership and governance structures in REITs. Several studies have examined 
the determinants of board independence in US (Ghosh and Sirmans, 2003) and 
Asian REITs (Kudus and Sing, 2011) respectively. In a related study, Wong et al. 
(2012) examine how much holdings sponsor hold during IPOs and report that 
sponsors tend to retain more shareholdings when they are developers, when their 
REITs are larger, and when institutional monitoring is stronger. Post IPO holdings 
also appear to be higher for sponsors who are more reputable as measured by both 
the size and the age of the sponsor firm. However, no studies have been 
conducted to explain how the sponsor ownership has evolved over time. 
 
2.2 Corporate ownership structure and performance 
 
2.2.1 Finance literature 
Though many studies have examined the relationship between corporate 
ownership and performance, the issue remains unresolved and contentious. The 
unresolved puzzle surrounding the relationship is largely because of the 
competing hypotheses put forward by various studies and the econometric 
problems that fraught the relationship between ownership and performance. The 
two major hypotheses that explain the relationship between managerial ownership 
and performance include incentive alignment hypothesis (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) and entrenchment hypothesis (Morck et al., 1988).  
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Incentive alignment hypothesis states that an increase in the managerial 
ownership can effectively align the aims of the managers and external 
shareholders and mitigate moral hazard problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Personal wealth of the managers is increasingly tied to the performance of the 
firm as managerial holdings increase. Therefore, managers will have the incentive 
to maximize the firm value, leading to superior firm performance/value.  
On the other hand, Entrenchment hypothesis states that as managerial 
holdings exceeds a certain threshold, the positive relationship between ownership 
and firm performance is expect to reverse because managers who have stronger 
voting rights will have the ability to consume perquisites instead of distributing 
profits to external shareholders (Morck et al, 1988). Larger equity holdings confer 
sponsors with strong voting rights to influence various financing and investment 
decisions, hinder hostile takeovers from the market and prevent shareholders from 
removing them from their managerial roles (Stulz, 1988). Therefore, the 
relationship between ownership and performance is expected to be non-linear and 
will reverse from positive to negative beyond a certain threshold. 
A competing view posited by Demsetz and Lehn (1983; 1985) and 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) argues that there should have no relationship 
between ownership and performance since ownership structure is endogenously 
determined based on observable firm characteristics. The argument states that 
empirical studies conducted should take into account the endogenous relationship 
between performance and ownership. Endogeneity can also be due to reverse 
causality between ownership and performance (Kole, 1994), suggesting that 
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managers will prefer stock compensation when performance is expected to 
improve in the future. On this notion, studies should consider using two-staged 
least squares (2SLS) and construct instrumental variables to tackle to possible 
endogeneity (Himmelberg et al., 1999). 
Various performance metrics like firm value – Tobin’s Q (Morck et al, 
1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Agarwal and Knoeber, 1996; Himmelberg et 
al. 1999) accounting profit (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 
2001) and firm performance – return on equity, return on asset, risk and 
expenditures (Core et al, 1999) has been used by previous studies. Earlier 
empirical results from Morck et al (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
supported the entrenchment hypothesis, illustrating a non monotonic inverse U 
shaped relation between ownership and firm value. However, these findings do 
not remain robust after controlling for endogeneity in a 2SLS specification (See 
Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Agarwal et al., 1996; Cho, 1998; Himmelberg et al. 
1999; Mak and Li, 2001; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001).  
The presence of alternate governance mechanisms like superior board 
structures (Yermack, 1996), stronger institutional monitoring (Pound, 1988), and 
strong monitoring from external block holders (Kaplan and Minton, 1994) has 
also been documented to significantly enhance firm performance and value, 
questioning the validity of those studies that have failed to account for the 




2.2.2 REIT Literature 
The relationship between corporate ownership and performance has also 
received significant attention in the REIT literature. Studies have examined how 
corporate ownership structure and governance mechanisms influence firm value 
using market-to-book ratio (Friday et al. 1999) and Tobin’s Q (Capozza and 
Seguin, 2003, Han, 2006), firm performance using ROA and ROE (Ghosh and 
Sirmans, 2003) and cash flows (Capozza and Seguin, 2003), risk taking behaviors 
(Capozza and Seguin, 2003; Dolde and Knopf, 2009) and managerial 
compensation (Capozza and Seguin, 2003).  
Acknowledging that ownership and performance may be endogenously 
determined data, studies conducted used fixed effects to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity (Han, 2006; Hartzell et al. 2006) and 2SLS (Ghosh and Sirmans, 
2003) on top of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to obtain more accurate estimates. 
To capture the possible non-linear relationship between ownership and 
performance, studies have also adopted piecewise linear (Friday et al, 1999; Han, 
2006; Dolde and Knopf, 2009) and quadratic specifications (Han, 2006) to 
capture the non-linearity in relationship. Most of the studies are conducted on US 
REITs, with different specifications yielding different results. 
Specifically, Friday et al. (1999) document a positive relationship between 
managerial holdings and REIT firm value from 0%-5%. Beyond the 5% threshold, 
managerial entrenchment leads to lower firm value. This study, however, fails to 
consider the endogeneity problem between performance and ownership and fails 
to control for the presence of alternate governance mechanisms.  Using fixed 
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effects and 2SLS to tackle the endogeneity problem, Han (2006) reports a 
significant non-linear positive relation between insider ownership and firm value. 
Firm value increases more rapidly when managerial ownership is in the range of 0% 
to 5% and this magnitude of increment decreases from 5% to 25%. Beyond the 25% 
mark, entrenchment effects set in with a reversal of relationship between 
managerial holdings and firm value.  
Instead of examining firm value, Capozza and Seguin (2003) directly 
measure the relationship between managerial holdings and managerial 
compensation to observe whether managers consume perquisites. They report that 
firms with higher managerial holdings actually pay lower management fees, 
dismissing the plausibility of more entrenched managers consuming private 
benefits. 
Another reason explaining why REITs with higher managerial holdings 
have poorer performance is the unwillingness of entrenched managers to 
undertake more risk. Managers are unwilling to invest in riskier projects because 
their personal wealth is tied to the performance of the firm. Empirically, Capozza 
and Seguin (2003) reveal that REITs with larger insider ownership tend to 
undertake less risk (asset beta, equity beta and leverage risk) and risk averse 
managerial behavior explains lower profitability (lower cash flow). A more recent 
study conducted by Dolde and Knopf (2009) confirms a non-linear relation 
between insider ownership and risk as beyond a certain ownership threshold 
managers begin to undertake more risk though such risk-taking behaviors may not 
necessary be beneficial for the firm.  
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Empirical evidence also illustrates the effectiveness of alternate 
governance mechanism in influencing firm performance. Specifically, Ghosh and 
Sirmans (2003) control for alternate governance mechanisms like board 
independence and CEO characteristics of the REIT when examining the 
relationship between managerial shareholdings and firm performance. They report 
that superior monitoring from outside directors and block holders (entrenched 
CEOs) can enhance (degrade) performance. Upon controlling for alternate 
mechanisms, insider ownership has an inconsequential effect on performance, 
questioning the validity of previous studies that have failed to control for alternate 
governance mechanisms. Han (2006) also find that the capacity for managers to 
consume perquisites at high managerial ownership levels is nullified by the 
stronger presence of institutional monitoring. 
Interestingly, using corporate governance index (CGI), Bauer, Eicholtz 
and Kok (2010) illustrated that the relationship between corporate governance 
measures, performance measures (ROA, ROE, FFO growth) and firm valuation 
(Tobin’s Q) is much weaker surrounding REITs. They explain that REIT 
managers operate under a more restricted setting with mandatory high payout 
requirements, effectively ameliorating the agency problems and reduce the need 
for alternate governance mechanisms to intervene and monitor managers. This 
explanation is supported when they report that the effectiveness of alternate 
governance mechanisms for REITs with lower dividend payouts, presumably 
suffering from agency problems due to larger free cash flows.  
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 There are fewer studies conducted in the Asian REITs context despite the 
prevalence of governance issues in Asian REITs. Corporate governance in Asian 
REITs is first examined by Kudus and Sing (2011) and they study the impact of 
governance structures like board structure, CEO characteristics, outside block 
holdings and managerial ownership on various performance metrics (ROA, ROE, 
ROI and Jensen’s Alpha) for a sample of REITs in Singapore, Japan, Malaysia, 
Hong Kong and South Korea. Their findings reveal that unlike US REITs, 
corporate governance structures do not significantly enhance firm value and 
operating performance. CEO appears to be influential as more entrenched CEOs 
enhance performance while longer serving CEOs tend to underperform. 
Managerial holdings, on the other hand, are negatively correlated to ROE though 
such entrenchment effects are attenuated at higher ownership levels. 
Using a corporate governance structure score framework from Asia 
Pacific Real Estate Association (APREA), Lecomte and Ooi (2012) investigate 
the impact of corporate governance on firm performance for a sample of S-REITs. 
They reveal that while operating performance is not enhanced by stronger 
corporate governance structures, stock performance is. In another study, Wong et 
al. (2011) examine the impact of sponsor holdings on IPO underpricing due to the 
unprecedented high holdings during IPOs for Asian REITs. Using a 2SLS 
framework, they indicate that commitment from Sponsors and institutional 
investors is positively correlated to underpricing. Their findings further reveal that 
higher sponsor ownership is able to signal to the market superior quality 





Overall, the development of modern corporations has sparkled tremendous 
attention on ownership and corporate governance in both finance and REIT 
literature. The two main issues are: (1) what explains the ownership structures in 
firms and (2) how does corporate ownership and governance structures influence 
firm performance?  
While the literature has been extensive, the empirical relationship is 
contentious given that it is fraught with econometric issues and given that 
conflicting results are obtained when different specifications are used. The 
literature on corporate ownership and governance in the Asian REIT market is 
evidently less developed when compared to the more mature US REIT market. 
The lack of studies is nonetheless due to the short trading history and the 
unavailability of data. 
Matching finance literature with REIT literature, the general theories 
should support that agency concerns are less prevalent in REITs and that it should 
be fairly easy for shareholders to monitor a REIT due to the restrictions that a 
REIT faced. Free cash flow problems as highlighted by Jensen (1986) are 
nullified by the high payout ratios in REITs to fulfill tax free requirements. Asset 
restrictions also mean that REITs are largely holding tangible assets that increase 
the ease for shareholders to value the firm and monitor the managerial actions 
(Himmelberg et al., 1999).  As a result, optimal equity shareholdings held by 
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sponsors should be lower due to lesser agency concerns and ease of firm 
monitoring.  
However, contradicting with the predictions in the literature, sponsor 
equity shareholdings in Asia are quite concentrated and much higher than the 
managerial shareholdings in US REITs. Sponsor shareholdings in Asian REITs 
also appear to vary across different REITs.  This study attempts to address this 
empirical puzzle by examining the determinants of sponsor ownership. Findings 
will reveal why certain sponsors choose to retain higher shareholdings than other 
sponsors.  
Many of the studies conducted in Asian REITs are either plagued with 
data availability (Kudus and Sing, 2011) or are focused in a particular REIT 
market (Lecomte and Ooi, 2012). On this notion, this study attempts to contribute 
to the literature with a richer set of corporate ownership data from REITs in 
Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong and Malaysia (from 2002 to 2012). Alternate 





Chapter 3: Data and 
Methodology 
 
In this section, the empirical models for each of the research questions will 
be described. Control variables for each model will be introduced and 
explanations will be provided for the inclusion of the variables in the model. Key 
research hypothesis for each question will then be highlighted. Details on the 
methodology will be elaborated in the subsequent section. Finally, data set and the 
methods for data collection will be described.  
 
3.1 Determinants of Corporate ownership structure  
3.1.1 Empirical Model 
 
To identify the important determinants for sponsor ownership in Asian 
REITs, the following model is estimated: 
                                                             
                                
 where SPOWN is the total shareholdings held by the sponsor firm and all 
its related companies divided by the number of shares in REITs. SPChar is a 
vector of sponsor characteristics that may influence the sponsors’ desire to retain 
equity shareholdings. Governance and Firm are vectors of control variables that 
capture the alternate governance mechanisms and firm specific characteristics 
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respectively. Time and country dummies are also included motivated by the fact 
that legislations may be weaker in some countries that can significantly affect 
sponsors’ ability to exercise their property rights (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens 
and Fan, 2002) 
Surrounding the vector of key variables SPChar include DevSP, BankSP 
SPListed, SPAge, REITAge, GLC and LN_Spinoffs. Specifically, DevSP is a 
binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the sponsor of the REIT is a developer. 
Developer sponsors tend to retain more shares during IPO (Wong et al., 2012). 
Developer sponsors have the incentive to retain larger shareholdings post IPO due 
to the prevalence of property transactions with their REITs. Larger shareholdings 
can give them stronger influence over related party investment decisions. BankSP 
is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the sponsor is a bank. Strong 
financials allow banks to retain larger shareholdings post IPO. Therefore, I will 
expect banks to retain larger REIT shareholdings when compared to other non-
developer, non-bank sponsors. 
GLC is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the sponsor is a 
government linked company. Mak and Li (2001) have indicated that GLCs tend to 
have weaker governance because of weaker accountability to profitability, lesser 
susceptibility to takeovers, and greater ease of financing and weaker monitoring 
from shareholders. Under such circumstances, GLC-sponsored REITs are 
subjected to larger agency concerns and to mitigate these problems I will expect 
GLC sponsors to hold larger shareholdings. 
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SPAge is the natural logarithm of the age of the Sponsor (calculated from 
the establishment date of sponsor) and SPListed is a binary variable that takes a 
value of 1 is the sponsor is listed in the stock exchange. An older sponsor who is 
listed in the stock exchange should be more reputable and thus remain as the 
sponsor post IPO (Wong et al, 2012).  
REITAge denotes the natural logarithm of the age of the REIT (calculated 
from the date of REIT IPO). This variable is included in the model to understand 
whether sponsors perceive their REITs as long term investment vehicles by 
maintaining stable or larger shareholdings post IPO. If that is the case, I will 
expect a positive relationship between sponsor shareholdings and REITAge. 
Alternatively, if sponsors perceive their REIT as a disposal vehicle, I will expect a 
reversal in relationship as sponsors gradually reduce their shareholdings overtime.  
Several sponsors spin off multiple REITs from their property portfolio 
(E.g. CapitaLand, Cheung Kong, Mapletree and Ascendas), either according to 
property type or location. Assuming that sponsors like managers are risk averse 
(Capozza and Seguin, 2003; Dolde and Knopf, 2009), their desire to diversify 
their risk should reduce sponsor shareholdings per REIT as the number of spin 
offs increases (LN_Spinoffs).  
 
3.1.2 Control variables  
 
As for alternate governance mechanisms, following Agarwal and Knoeber 
(1996), Denis and Sarin (1999) and Mak and Li (2001), I control for institutional 
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ownership (INSTIOWN), external block ownership (BLOCKOWN), board 
structures that include board size (BODSIZE) and board independence 
(OUTBOARD) and debt monitoring (Leverage). The delegation of monitoring to 
stronger alternate governance mechanisms should effectively diminish the agency 
problems within the REITs and therefore, lowering the optimal level of sponsor 
ownership.  
As for firm specific characteristics, firm size (Size), which is defined as 
the natural logarithm of the REITs’ total assets is controlled for. An increase in 
the firm size should increase the cost for managers to hold a given fraction of the 
firm (a fixed percentage). Therefore, risk averse managers will reduce their 
shareholdings to diversify their risk (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Based on the 
notion that the difficulty of monitoring managers can vary across the different 
property types, in turn influencing the optimal sponsor ownership levels, REIT 
sector dummies (Hotel, Retail, Industrial and Office) are also controlled for.  
Following Himmelberg et al. (1999), I control for the stock return 
volatility (Vol) with the standard deviation of daily stock returns. The higher the 
volatility of returns, the harder it is to monitor the managers. Therefore, higher 
sponsor holdings are required to reduce agency problems. To address the 
possibility that superior firm performance may induce sponsors to increase their 
shareholdings by exercising stock options (Agarwal and Knoeber, 1996; Denis 




3.1.3 Key hypotheses 
 
The following section entails the key hypotheses and the predictions for 
the relationship between sponsor shareholdings and dependent variables: 
H1: Sponsors will hold less shareholdings as REITs gets older. 
There are several reasons for this relationship. Firstly, if REITs are created 
by sponsors to dispose their illiquid investment properties, then sponsor 
ownership will likely to decrease gradually overtime. Secondly, REITs tend to 
achieve organic growth only in the initial stages with increasing difficulty to make 
yield accretive acquisitions (Ooi et al, 2012) as REITs get older. Therefore, to test 
this hypothesis, I control for the age of the REIT (REITAge) in the models and I 
will expect a negative relationship between sponsor shareholdings and REIT age. 
H2: Holdings from developer, bank and GLC sponsors and more reputable 
sponsors should be higher than other sponsors. 
Given the frequent property transactions between REITs and developer 
sponsors, developer sponsors may desire to retain more shareholdings for stronger 
controls over investment decisions in REITs. The optimal sponsor holdings may 
also be higher given the moral hazard problems from frequent related property 
transactions. As such, shareholdings are expected to be higher for developer 
sponsors (Dev_SP). Government-linked sponsors (GLC), who subject their REITs 
to greater scope of moral hazard due to weaker monitoring, are predicted to hold 
more shareholdings to mitigate agency concerns. Bank sponsors (Bank_SP), with 
stronger financials, will be expected to retain larger shareholdings when 
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compared to non-bank, non-developer sponsors. I also expect more reputable 
sponsors, either older sponsors (SPAge) or listed sponsors (SPListed), to retain 
higher holdings post IPO similar to Wong et al. (2012) given that reputable 
sponsors are usually financially stronger, having greater capacity to hold more 
shareholdings. 
H3: Sponsor ownership will reduce as the number of REITs spin-off increases 
If sponsors are risk adverse (Capozza and Seguin, 2003; Dolde and Knopf, 2009), 
I would expect them to diversify their holdings and reduce risk profile by holding 
less holdings for each of their sponsored REIT. Therefore, a negative relationship 
is expected between sponsor shareholdings and number of REITs spun off by 
sponsors (LN_Spinoffs).  
 
3.2 Corporate ownership and Performance 
3.2.1 Empirical Model 
 
To examine the relationship between corporate ownership, governance 
structures and performance, I specify the following model: 
                                                      
                   
where the dependent variable Tobins’ Q measures the firm value for each 
REIT. It is defined as the sum of market value of common stocks, book value of 
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debt and preferred securities divided by the book value of total assets. The key 
variable is SPOwn is defined as the total number of shares held by Sponsors 
divided by the total number of outstanding shares in the REIT. If the incentive 
alignment hypothesis holds, firm value could be positively associated with 
sponsor ownership. Alternatively, if larger sponsor ownership permits managerial 
entrenchment, the relationship is expected to reverse at higher sponsor ownership. 
The rest of the variables, Governance, Firm, TimeDum and CtryDum are as 
defined in earlier models. 
3.2.2 Control variables  
 
To deal with the possibility that firm value and sponsor ownership may be 
spuriously correlated, governance mechanisms and firm characteristics are 
controlled for. Surrounding firm specific characteristics, firm size (Size) is 
included as a control motivated by the fact that it may be easier for sponsors to 
own a larger proportion of a smaller firm (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). As such, it is 
expected that Size and Tobin’s Q will be negatively correlated. Following 
Himmelberg et al. (1999), I measure the profitability of the REIT with the ratio of 
net income over total revenues (NI/REV). More profitable REITs should be more 
highly valued by the market. Further, stock volatility (Vol) surrounding the REIT 
stock price returns is added as a regressor as optimal managerial ownership may 
increase with stock price volatility (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz and 




Leverage (Leverage) is included as a control variable as debt holders are 
superior monitors that can alleviate agency problems due to their ability to collect 
more information about firm during lending activities (Diamond, 1991). As 
leverage increases, debt holders are likely to enhance their monitor and therefore 
firm value/performance will improve.  Given that firm value is higher surrounding 
stronger boards (Yermack, 1996; Ghosh and Sirmans, 2003), stronger institutional 
monitoring (Pound, 1988; Han, 2006), and strong monitoring from external block 
holders (Kaplan and Minton, 1994), I control for board size (BODSIZE), board 
independence (OUTBOD), institutional (INSTIOWN) and outside block 
ownership (BLOCKOWN) respectively. Following Himmelberg et al. (1999), 
country, time and sector (Hotel, Retail, Industrial and Office) dummies are 
included because unobserved heterogeneity may influence performance.  
3.2.3 Key hypotheses 
 
The following section entails the key hypotheses and the predictions for 
the relationship between key and dependent variables: 
H1: Relationship between sponsor shareholdings and REIT firm value is likely 
to be non-linear.  
I hypothesize a positive relationship between sponsor ownership and firm 
value similar to the findings reported by Friday et al. (1999) and Han (2006) at 
lower ownership levels.  Larger shareholdings induce sponsors to enhance REIT 
firm value as their wealth is increasingly tied to the stock performance of their 
REIT. However, this relationship is unlikely to persist at higher ownership levels. 
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As shareholdings increase beyond a certain threshold, sponsors have stronger 
voting rights and are less susceptible to hostile takeovers. Entrenched 
shareholdings permit sponsors to consume perquisites at the expense of minority 
shareholders. Therefore, the relationship between sponsor shareholdings and 
REIT firm value is likely to be inversed u-shaped whereby incentive alignment 
effects (entrenchment effects) occur at lower (higher) ownership thresholds. 
  
H2: Developer sponsors are more able to create (destroy) wealth for their 
sponsored REITs due to their real estate expertise (prevalence of related party 
transactions).  
I hypothesize that incentive alignment effects (entrenchment effects) are 
likely to be more pronounced for developer sponsors due to their expertise in real 
estate (likelihood of consuming perquisites from prevalence of related party 
property transactions). Backing from developer sponsors not only enhances 
growth opportunities due to the supply of a pipeline of properties for future 
acquisitions, but also improves operating performance by mitigating vacancy risk 
and lowering operating expenses. However, developer sponsored REITs can 
easily consume private benefits from related party property transactions
5
, acting 
both buyers and sellers in these transactions. Given the high frequency of post 
IPO related party transactions with their REITs, I expect entrenchment effects to 
                                                          
5
 Approximately 77% of all the related party property transactions in Japan and Singapore REITs 
from 2003-2011 are made by developer sponsors with their REITs.  
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be stronger surrounding developer sponsored REITs. On this notion, a more 
prominent inversed-u-shaped relation is expected for developer sponsored REITs. 
H3: Bank sponsors are able to create wealth for their REITs by providing ready 
credit. 
 Backing from bank sponsors are extremely valuable for financially 
constrained REITs that are required to payout most of their free cash as dividends 
to be exempted from taxes. Therefore, the ability to secure credit readily to 
replace maturing debts or to make timely acquisitions becomes very important for 
REITs.  As such, I expect that bank sponsors who are heavily entrenched in their 
REITs to confer stronger financial benefits. Bank sponsored REITs are more 
likely to be able to raise debt to tap onto valuable investment opportunities or to 
replace maturing debt even when credit conditions deteriorate, resulting in higher 
REIT firm value.  
H4: REITs with higher alternate governance mechanisms will have higher firm 
value due to stronger monitoring effects. 
Alternate governance mechanisms like institutional owners (Pound, 1988; 
Han, 2006), outside board members (Yermack, 1996; Ghosh and Sirmans, 2003) 
and external block holders (Kaplan and Minton, 1994) have been extensively 
documented in the literature to be able to monitor managerial actions and reduce 
agency cost. Therefore, it is expected that stronger presence of alternate 
governance structures can reduce the power of sponsors and prevent them from 
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consuming private benefits. I hypothesize that REITs with stronger governance 
structures will have higher REIT firm value. 
 
3.3 Research methods 
3.3.1 Functional Forms –GMM (Generalized Methods of Moment) and 
fixed effects 
 
One of the main concerns in studies conducted surrounding ownership and 
performance is the endogeneity between performance measures and ownership 
structure. Spurious correlation between performance and ownership could be due 
to the fact that ownership and performance are endogenously determined by same 
set of firm specific characteristics (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), omitted variable 
bias (Himmelberg et al., 1999) and reverse causality (Kole, 1996).  
Therefore, to tackle endogeneity problems, I follow Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) by constructing sponsor ownership with instruments. Instead of using the 
conventional 2SLS used in previous studies like Ghosh and Sirmans (2003), Han 
(2006) and Kudus and Sing (2011), I adopt GMM based on the notion that 
estimation using a cross country panel data is likely to cause error terms to be 
heteroscedastic. Error terms are likely to be correlated within each specific REIT 
during estimation and cause error terms to be inconsistent. Therefore, using GMM 
will allow more robust standard errors to be obtained from estimation. 
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  To avoid the problem that corporate ownership may be spuriously 
correlated with performance, I further adopt fixed effects (year and property type 
fixed effects) to control for possible heterogeneity between firms (Himmelberg et 
al., 1999). Unlike those specifications adopted by Himmelberg et al. (1999) and 
Han (2006) that controlled for firm-fixed effects, I choose not to do so because 
such specifications will take away significant degrees of freedom. Another reason 
is because this study is an industrial specific study unlike Himmelberg et al. (1999) 
and therefore different firms in the same industry are likely to be more similar 
than different. 
  
3.3.2 Specifications – Linear, Quadratic and Piecewise Linear 
 
To capture the possible non-linear relations between corporate ownership 
structure and the dependent variable, I specify quadratic and piecewise linear 
regressions on top of the linear regression model.  For the piecewise regression 
analysis, similar to Morck, Vishny and Shleifer (1988), sponsor ownership is 
broken down into breakpoints of 5% and 25%. The breakpoints are illustrated 
below: 
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The 5% breakpoint is adopted because at 5% level or above it is 
increasingly difficult for shareholders to dispose their shares with limited trading 
liquidity. 5% ownership level is also the point of mandatory public disclosure as 
stated by various acts in Japan, Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong. The 
justification for using the 25% breakpoint is motivated by Weston (1979) who 
argues that beyond the 20%-30% range, the hostile bid for a firm will fail and it 
will be hard to acquire the firm. Furthermore, Morck, Schleifer and Vishny (1988) 
have experimented with the various breakpoints, before identifying 5% and 25% 
breakpoints has the lowest sum of squared errors.  The advantage of employing 
the piecewise linear model is that it allow us to observe the relationship between 
sponsor shareholdings and REIT firm value at different ownership thresholds, 
allowing us to document any incentive alignment and entrenchment effects. As 
highlighted before, if there are entrenchment effects surrounding larger sponsor 
shareholdings, I will expect an inverse u-shaped relation between sponsor 
shareholdings and REIT firm value, in which the coefficient of SPOWN1 is 
positive and SPOWN3 is negative. 
 
3.4 Data and sources 
 
This study focuses on the ownership and corporate governance structures 
in REITs in Japan, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore (J suffix denotes Japan, 
HK suffix denotes Hong Kong, M suffix denotes Malaysia and S suffix denotes 
Singapore) over the period from 2002- 2012. The key variable Sponsor ownership 
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(SPOwn), external block ownership (BLOCKOWN), board independence 
(OUTBOD) and board size (BODSIZE) are hand collected from the bi-annual 
financial reports. Institutional ownership (INSTIOWN) is collected from SNL 
REIT Database and missing data6 is supplemented with Factset Database. Firm 
specific characteristics like leverage ratio (Lev), stock price volatility (Vol), firm 
size (Size), Tobin’s Q, age of REIT (REITAge) and stock price returns (REITRet) 
are collected from Thomson Datastream. Details on sponsors like the industry of 
sponsors, sponsor age (SPAge), whether sponsors are listed (SPListed) and the 
number of spin offs (LN_Spinoffs) are collected from Sponsors’ website. In total, 
I capture 774 bi-annual observations (417 from J-REITs, 68 from M-REITs, 77 
from HK-REITs, 212 from S-REITs) from 71 REITs (31 J-REITs, 11 M-REITs, 8 
HK-REITs, and 23 S-REITs). Missing observations for independent variables 
reduce the final sample size for cross sectional regressions to 752.  The definitions 
of the variables are summarized in Table 3. 
[Table 3]  
                                                          
6
 SNL REIT database do not have institutional holdings for REITs in Malaysia. I supplement the 
missing observations with data from Factset. 
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Chapter 4: Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics in Table 4 highlights that Asian sponsors on average 
retain about 24% of their REIT shareholdings. Amongst the different countries, 
Malaysian sponsors (Japanese sponsors) retain largest shareholdings - 52.5% 
(least shareholdings - 15.5%). The large difference can be attributed to the 
legislation framework in protecting shareholder’s rights in the different countries. 
Sponsor will tend to hold more shareholdings if the legislations are weak in 
protecting their property rights (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens and Fan, 2002).  
[Table 4] 
Most of the REITs are backed by developer sponsors (67.7%) though 
some of the REITs are spun off from banks (23.8%). Most of these bank-
sponsored REITs are listed in Japan (37.6%) and Hong Kong (22.1%) while none 
are found Malaysia. Conversely, I observe that most REITs in Singapore (84.9%) 
and Malaysia (80.9%) are backed by developers. Higher sponsor ownership levels 
in Malaysia and Singapore as compared to Japan could be due to the fact that bulk 
of the REITs are developer sponsors, given that developer sponsors retain higher 
shareholdings during IPO (Wong et al., 2012).  
14.9% of the REITs in Asia are backed by government linked companies 
and most of them are listed in Singapore (46.2%) while none of the REITs in 
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Japan are government linked. Sponsors in Japan are considerably more reputable 
than other countries as majority of them are listed (90.2%) and are much older 
(56.0 years old). Least reputable Sponsors are found in Malaysia with only 35.3% 
of them listed with an average age of 45.0 years old. 
Approximately 10.5% and 27.6% of the shareholdings in Asian REITs are 
held by external block holders and institutional investors respectively. Amongst 
the different countries, institutional investors favor more mature REIT markets in 
Japan (29.7%) and Singapore (30.0%). A typical REIT in Asia has 6 board 
members with approximately 60% of them external directors. While J-REITs 
have the largest proportion of outside directors (67.5%), they have the smallest 
boards (3.64). Conversely, HK-REITs have the largest board (7.87) while M-
REITs boards have the lowest outside directors’ representation (40.0%).  
REITs in Asia also trade closely to their underlying asset values with an 
average Tobin’s Q of 0.98 that vary across the different countries. While HK-
REITs trade much lower as compared to their underlying assets (0.82), J-REITs 
(1.04) are trading above their net asset value. J- REITs (4.4 years old) and S-
REITs (3.8 years old) are comparatively older than M-REITs (2.5 years old) and 
HK-REITs (2.7 years old). Smallest REITs are found in Malaysia (USD$219 
million) while S-REITs (USD$4,231 million) are the largest. In terms of 
profitability, S-REITs (0.75) are most profitable while J-REITs (0.62) are least 
profitable when I use the ratio of net income and total revenue as proxy. Due to 
differences in legislation restrictions across countries, I also observe that J-REITs 
are the most leveraged (48.9%) while M-REITs are the least leveraged (28.9%). 
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The stock prices are most volatile surrounding HK-REITs (0.085) and least 
volatile in S-REITs (0.015).  
Figure 3 illustrates the bi-variate relationship between sponsor ownership 
and the key dependent variables that include a vector of alternate governance 
mechanisms (institutional holdings, external block holdings, board size and 
outside board representation), REIT age and the number of REIT spin-offs by 
Sponsors. The preliminary findings reveal that REITs with stronger monitoring 
from institutional, blockholders and external board members, as captured by 
larger shareholdings from institutional investors and external block holders and 
larger external board representation, have much lower sponsor shareholdings. 
This result is consistent with the prediction that shareholders delegate monitoring 
to alternate governance mechanisms, thus reducing the optimal level of sponsor 
holdings (Agarwal and Knoeber, 1996). Interestingly, I find that sponsors have a 
tendency to gradually offload their shareholdings as their REITs get older, 
dismissing the view that sponsors treat REITs as a long term holding investment 
vehicle.  
[Figure 3] 
I further stratify the sample according to the different sponsors (bank, 
developers and others) to examine whether the nature of the sponsors affect their 
retention of shareholdings and the REIT firm value. Results are summarized in 
Table 5. Similar to Wong et al. (2012), I document that developer sponsors retain 
higher shareholdings (27.5%) when compared to non-developer sponsors (15.7%). 
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On the other hand, banks (14.5%) and other non-developer sponsors (19.2%) 
retain much lower shareholdings post IPO. The risk profile or strong financial 
backing from government could explain the higher retention of shareholdings by 
government linked sponsors (32.3%) when compared to non-government linked 
sponsors (22.2%).  
Banking relationships appear to enhance REIT firm value as I find that 
bank sponsored REITs has significantly higher Tobin’s Q (1.04) when compared 
to non-bank sponsored REITs (0.96). Conversely, sponsors that are neither banks 
nor developers have much lower firm valuations (0.81) when compared to bank 
and developer sponsored REITs (0.97). Poorer performance could be attributed to 
the lack of tangible benefits conferred by these non-bank and non-developer 
sponsors.  
[Table 5] 
Figure 4 presents the bi-variate relationship between different governance 
mechanisms and Tobin’s Q. A non-linear relationship is detected between sponsor 
shareholdings and firm value across the different ownership levels. Firm value 
increases with sponsor shareholdings from 0% to 20% with firm value peaking 
when sponsor shareholdings rises to 20%. Beyond the threshold, I observe 
entrenchment effects as higher sponsor holdings correlate with lower firm value. 
While it is unclear whether larger boards and concentration of shareholdings by 
external blockholders can enhance firm value, REITs with larger outside board 
representation and institutional holdings outperform other REITs. This result 
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suggests that external directors and institutional investors are more effective 
monitors that can enhance REIT firm value. 
[Figure 4] 
Table 6 presents the pair-wise correlation coefficients of the explanatory 
variables. In addition, the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each variable is 
reported in the last column as a diagnostic test7. On the whole, the magnitude of 
the correlation coefficients and VIF suggest that multicollinearity is not a serious 
problem in the regression models. 
[Table 6] 
 
4.2 Determinants of Sponsor ownership 
 
To identify the important determinants that influence the sponsor 
shareholdings in Asian REITs, I specify cross sectional regressions with sponsor 
ownership as dependent variable. Furthermore, I run country level regressions 
based on the intuition that country specific legislations and institutional 
framework can influence the estimates. Results are shown in Table 7. Most of the 
dependent variables carry the predicted signs. However, these signs are not 
                                                          
7
 The VIF for each variable,        
   shows the increase in         that can be attributable to 
the fact that this variable is not orthogonal to the other variables in the model. It follows that the 
more highly correlated a variable is with the other variables in the model (collectively), the greater 
its variance will be. While there is no consensus on what values of the VIF merit attention, some 
authors suggest that values in excess of 10 are problematic (See Greene, 2002). 
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consistent across the different countries. The t-statistics of the estimates are 
computed using White (1980) heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors. 
[Table 7] 
Empirical evidence suggests that the sponsor characteristics can materially 
influence their retention of shares post IPO. Similar with findings of Wong et al. 
(2012), I observe that developer sponsors (Dev_SP) tend to hold 9.5% more 
shares than non-bank and non-developer sponsors (other). Higher retention of 
shareholdings could be due to the desire to maintain stronger controls over 
investment decisions as developer sponsors frequently conduct related party 
transactions with their REITs post IPO. Bank sponsors also retain 5.3% more 
shares than other non-bank and non-developer sponsors. Desire for bank sponsors 
to diversify their real estate exposure by selling their investment properties into 
the REITs could explain their preference to hold lesser shareholdings when 
compared to developer sponsors. Holding other factors constant, government 
linked sponsors (GLC_SP) is reported to retain 10.4% more shares than non-GLC 
sponsors. Their high retention of REIT shareholdings could be driven by the 
compatibility of the risk and return of REITs with their investment requirements. 
Reputation of the sponsors matters to firm valuation. Older sponsors 
(SPAge) who are presumably more reputable retain larger shareholdings. 
Sponsors are reported to be risk averse (Capozza and Seguin, 2003; Dolde and 
Knopf, 2009) as they attempt to diversify their risk by holding less shares per 
REIT as the number of REITs backed by a sponsor increases (LN_Spinoffs).  
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Stronger presence of alternate governance mechanisms depresses sponsor 
shareholdings. REITs with higher institutional (INSTIOWN), external block 
holdings (BLOCKOWN), leverage ratios (Leverage), and board size (BODSize) 
and outside board representation (OUTBOD) have significantly lower sponsor 
shareholdings. This finding is consistent with the predictions that alternate 
governance mechanisms can attenuate the magnitude of agency problems within 
the firm and thus reduce the optimal managerial holdings that are required to align 
the incentives of managers and shareholders (Agarwal et al., 1996; Denis and 
Sarin, 1999).  
Sponsors reduce their shareholdings as their REITs get older (REITAge), 
suggesting that they do not view REITs as long term investment vehicle. Similar 
to the findings of Wong et al. (2012), I report that sponsor shareholdings increases 
with REIT firm size (Size). This result could be driven by the unique institutional 
structure in Asia whereby larger REITs are usually backed by stronger sponsors 
that take concentrated holdings.  Better performing REITs as captured by higher 
firm value (Tobins’ Q) have comparably higher sponsor holdings and this is 
consistent with the findings of Kole (1994) and Cho (1998). This finding raises 
concerns of reverse causality between ownership and performance.   
Empirical evidence indicates that sponsor holdings vary across different 
countries. Specifically, sponsors in Japan (Malaysia) retain the lowest (highest) 
shareholdings. Estimates do not remain consistent when regressions are conducted 
on a country level. One explanation for the low retention of shareholdings by J-
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REITs sponsor is the difficulty to trigger a hostile takeover by other investors due 
to the large percentage of votes required in the resolution. 
Findings are largely driven by the J-REITs sample due to the sheer sample 
size. While developer (Dev_SP) and bank sponsors (Bank_SP) in Japan retain 
significantly larger shareholdings, these sponsors in Singapore and Hong Kong do 
not retain more equity holdings. Conversely, developer sponsors (Dev_SP) in 
Malaysia hold significantly lesser shareholdings. Similarly, only government 
linked sponsors (GLCs) in Singapore possess larger shareholdings while those in 
Hong Kong have significantly lesser shareholdings. 
 
4.3 Sponsor ownership and firm value 
 
In this segment, I extend the study to explore the relationship between 
sponsor ownership and firm value. Table 8 reports the regression results of 
Tobin’s Q and sponsor ownership for three different specifications (linear, 
quadratic and piecewise linear) estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). All 
specifications include time and sector fixed effects (Hotel, Residential, Retail, 
Office, Industrial and Diversified). Overall, the results are fairly consistent across 
different specifications and with the earlier predictions.  
[Table 8] 
Consistent with the findings of Capozza and Seguin (2003) and Hartzell, 
Sun and Titman (2006), I report only robust incentive alignment effects across the 
56 
 
different specifications between sponsor ownership and REIT firm value. Other 
things equal, Tobin’s Q increase by 0.192 with every 1% increase in sponsor 
holdings. Higher sponsor holdings appear to align the interest of shareholders and 
sponsors, inducing them to pursue wealth maximizing policies that increases 
REIT firm value. This relationship is only linear as both quadratic and piecewise 
linear models reveal that sponsors do not consume private benefits with more 
entrenched equity shareholdings. 
Evidently, alternate governance mechanisms enhance firm monitoring and 
create wealth for shareholders. In particular, the presence of stronger institutional 
monitoring enhances REIT firm value, as REITs with higher institutional 
ownership (INSTIOWN) have higher Tobin’s Q. This finding is similar to that 
reported in Pound (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Han (2006). 
Analogous to Friday and Sirmans (1998) and Ghosh and Sirmans (2003), I also 
detect that REITs with boards made up by a larger proportion of outside directors 
(OUTBOD) and with boards that are larger (BODSize) are more highly valued by 
the market. Both internal (board of directors) and external (institutional investors) 
monitoring appears to create value for REITs.  
Across the different specifications, the coefficient REITAge and NI/REV is 
significant and positive, indicating that older REITs (REITAge) and more 
profitable (NI/REV) REITs have higher firm valuation. On the other hand, larger 
REITs (Size) have significantly lower Tobin’s Q when compared to smaller 
REITs. Lower market valuation could be due to the lack of growth opportunities 
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for these larger REITs as they find it increasingly hard to enhance REIT yields 
with new acquisitions. 
One of the major concerns is the endogeneity between ownership and 
performance (Demsetz and Lehn, 1983; 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001), 
which may stem from unobserved heterogeneity between different firms 
(Himmelberg et al., 1999), reverse causality between performance and ownership 
(Kole, 1994) and simultaneity in the determination of ownership and firm specific 
characteristics that influence firm performance (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). While 
most of these studies tackle the endogeneity problem using 2SLS (two stage least 
squares), the unobserved heterogeneity across different REITs in different 
countries are likely to cause error terms
8
 to be heteroscedastic. Therefore, I 
improve the estimation methods by using GMM to obtain more robust standard 
errors. 
As highlighted by Himmelberg et al. (1999), it is difficult to find good 
instruments for sponsor ownership because it is likely that selected instruments 
are plausibly those that also determine Tobin’s Q. Therefore, according to the 
results in Table 5, I identify a vector of sponsor related characteristics (SPAge, 
Dev_SP, Bank_SP, LNSpinoffs, GLC_SP) that is correlated with sponsor 
ownership as instruments. 
Table 9 reports the estimations for linear, quadratic and piecewise 
specifications. Analogous to earlier findings, the estimated coefficient for sponsor 
                                                          
8
 Error terms are likely to be correlated within each specific REIT during estimation which caused 
error terms to be inconsistent. I make sure of GMM to estimate our standard errors according to 
clusters to obtain more robust standard error terms. 
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ownership remains positive and significant at a 10% level after controlling for 
endogeneity in both linear and quadratic models. The squared sponsor ownership 
term (SPOwnSq) of the quadratic model further reveals that such incentive 
alignment effects are likely to diminish at higher sponsor ownership levels.  
However, these findings do not remain robust in the piecewise linear 
model after controlling for endogeneity. Though the negative sign of coefficient 
SPOWN_25abv is consistent with entrenchment hypothesis, it is not statistically 
significant. Surrounding the effects of alternate governance mechanisms, the 
effects of institutional monitoring (INSTIOWN) and outside board members 
remain robust on firm value in the GMM estimations. 
Heteroscedasticity concerns as reflected by the Pagan-Hall test, justifies 
the choice of using GMM instead of 2SLS. Surrounding the validity of the chosen 
instruments, the post-estimation test statistics firmly rejects that the instruments 
are weak (Anderson Rubin Wald test) or invalid (Hansen J-statistic). Furthermore, 
Durbin-Wu-Hausmann (DWH) test reveals that endogeneity is not a cause of 
concern. In the absence of endogeneity, estimates from OLS may not necessary be 
inconsistent. Further, the use of instrumental variables leads to the loss of 
efficiency and excludes important variables (sponsor related characteristics) that 
may influence firm value. In addition, it is often hard to identify good instruments. 




Country level estimations are conducted and presented in Table 10. Like 
earlier regressions, the estimates from the combined sample are largely driven by 
the J-REIT sample. Incentive alignment effects are strongest in J-REITs while 
entrenchment effects are reported in M-REITs. Overall, these alignment effects 
appear at different ownership levels in the different countries.  
Comparing the legislations in protecting minority shareholders from 
sponsor entrenchment, it is arguably weakest in J-REITs. Not only independent 
valuations are not required for RPTs, but such transactions do not require 
approval from neither board of directors or independent unitholders. Weak 
legislations against RPTs allow sponsors to easily consume perquisites. Therefore, 
given the presence of agency problems, the marginal alignment effects 
surrounding larger sponsor shareholdings are greater in J-REITs. Weaker 
alignment effects in surrounding HK-REITs and S-REITs may be attributed to the 
presence of legislations to protect against tunneling, lessening the alignment 
effects from sponsor shareholdings.  
As for M-REITs, I observe a significant negative relationship between 
sponsor ownership and firm value from 0% to 5% and beyond 25% shareholdings. 
One explanation is due to the underdevelopment of governance mechanisms, 
allowing more entrenched sponsors to consume perquisites. The monitoring 
effects of alternate governance mechanisms are clearly absent as none of the 




The effects of alternate governance mechanisms on firm value are mixed 
across the different countries. The presence of institutional investors (INSTIOWN) 
enhances J-REIT and S-REIT firm value. More outside board representation 
(OUTBOD) and larger boards (BODSize) correlates with higher market valuation 
for S-REITs and HK-REITs respectively. Monitoring from debt holders is only 
effective for S-REITs.  As for M-REITs,  
[Table 10] 
 
4.4 Type of Sponsor and firm value 
 
Motivated by the fact that the nature of sponsors may influence the 
relationship between REIT firm value and sponsor holdings, I further control for 
sponsor characteristics which include type of sponsors (Bank, developer, GLC), 
sponsor reputation (SPAge and SPList) and the number of spinoffs made by 
sponsors. Understanding that country specific characteristics can influence the 
estimates, I further added country dummies
9
 (Japan, Malaysia and Singapore) in 
the different analysis to capture for country effects. The results are presented in 
Table 11.  
[Table 11] 
                                                          
9
 I did not conduct stratified regressions based on the type of sponsor and the country the REITs is 
listed because the sample size is too small. 
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Consistent with earlier findings, I report a robust incentive alignment 
effects when sponsor ownership increases from 0-5% after controlling for sponsor 
characteristics. No significant relation between sponsor holdings and Tobin’s Q is 
reported beyond the 5% mark. Contrary to the predictions, I do not find that 
REITs sponsored by developer sponsors (Dev_SP) outperform other REITs with 
higher firm value. Banks sponsored REITs (Bank_SP), on the other hand, are 
more highly valued by the market.  Government-linked sponsors (GLC_SP) do 
not appear to provide any observable benefits that enhance REIT Tobin’s Q.   
REITs that are backed by sponsors with a larger number of spin offs 
(LN_Spinoffs) have higher firm value. There are several explanations to this 
phenomenon. One possible explanation is that sponsors that backed more REITs 
appear to spin off REITs that are more specialized
10
 in terms of property type or 
location and this specialization could be rewarded by the investors. Another 
reason is that sponsors that spin off more REITs are usually bigger and there is a 
reputation effect surrounding these REITs, attributing to higher valuation.  
Upon controlling for sponsor characteristics, I observe that many alternate 
governance mechanisms do not significantly enhance REIT firm value with the 
exception of institutional monitoring (INSTIOWN) and boards with larger 
proportion of independent directors (OUTBOD). This finding raises the concern 
whether alternate governance mechanisms are effective in monitoring sponsors 
and creating shareholder wealth.  
                                                          
10
 An example of such a sponsor is CapitaLand in Singapore. Over the last decade it has spun off 6 
different REITs which include Capital Mall Trust, Capital Commercial Trust, Ascott Residence 
Trust, Capital Retail China Trust, Capital Mall Malaysia Trust and Quill Capital Trust. These 
REITs are highly specialized either according to location of the property or property type.  
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I further segregate the sample according to the type of sponsors on the 
notion that the probability to confer benefits or consume private benefits could 
differ across the type of sponsors. For instance, developer sponsors are more able 
to enhance operating performance with real estate management expertise or 
enhance growth opportunities by selling properties to be sold to their REIT. 
Strong financial backing from banks could facilitate bank sponsored REITs in 
securing refinancing which is increasingly valuable given the deteriorating credit 
conditions due to the global financial crisis. However, frequent property 
transactions with developer sponsors also mean that they have more opportunities 
to extract wealth via unfavorable related party transactions. Therefore, while I 
expect bank and developer sponsors to be more able to create wealth for REIT 
shareholders, it will also be more probable to observe consumption of perquisites 
from developer sponsors.  
The empirical findings appear to support the predictions. Surrounding both 
bank and developer sponsors, I observe a significant alignment effects at a similar 
ownership range from 0% to 5% as higher sponsor holdings correlates with 
superior REIT firm value. Notably, the alignment effects as evidenced by the 
magnitude of the coefficient for SPOWN_0to5 surrounding developer sponsors 
are much larger when compared to banks. On the other hand, non-bank and non-
developer sponsors (others) have the smallest alignment effects and requires a 
significant amount of equity holdings (above 25%) for sponsors to create value 
for their shareholders.  
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However, the positive relationship between sponsor shareholdings and 
firm value disappear as shareholdings increase beyond 5% level. While the 
negative coefficient of SPOWN_5to25 indicate the possibility of entrenchment 
from developer and bank sponsors, the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
The results further reveal that more reputable sponsors may not necessary create 
value for their REITs, as evidenced by the negative (positive) coefficient of 
SPList (SPAge). Specialization of REITs is rewarded by investors as I report that 
the number of spin offs (LN_Spinoffs) is positive correlated with the REIT firm 
value. 
 Upon stratification of the analysis, the monitoring effects from alternate 
governance mechanisms are further diminished. The effects of institutional 
monitoring (INSTIOWN) and debt holders (Leverage) are observed only in 




4.5 Robustness test 
 
In the robustness test, I attempt to address various problems that have been 
highlighted by previous literature surrounding analysis between ownership 
structure and firm value. Firstly, I follow Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Han (2006) 
and only include REITs with more than 3 years of observations. In addition, 
acknowledging that changes in sponsor holdings may not be contemporaneous 
with changes to REIT firm value, I use lead Tobin’s Q as dependent variable, 
which is the future Tobin’s Q at time t+1 (half a year later). Final sample size is 
reduced from 752 to 633. 
 Furthermore, on the notion that sponsor holdings may be relatively static 
(Denis and Sarin, 1999) especially from bi-annual observations, I conduct 
estimations using yearly observations (constructed by taking the average of 
annual observations). The sample size is reduced by half to 363 in the yearly 
regressions. I also introduce additional regressors that include (1) AssetGrowth 
which is that the change in the total asset at t+1 on the notion that Tobin’s Q 
could be measuring future growth opportunities (Himmelberg et al., 1999) and (2) 
NumInstiOWN which is the total number of institutional investors on the notion 
that more institutional investors can enhance the monitoring of sponsor actions.  
Table 12 presents the results from the robustness test. Overall, the findings 
are fairly identical to earlier specifications. In particular, incentive alignment 
effects remain robust when sponsor holding is between 0 to 5% whether I use lead 
Tobin’s Q or Yearly Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable.  I also report that 
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REITs that are backed by GLCs are more highly valued by the market. One 
explanation is that government linked sponsors tend to be more long term 
investors and thus they have less incentives to extract private benefits from the 
REITs. 
[Table 12] 
Interestingly, upon controlling for the number of institutional investors 
(NumINSTIOWN), the significance and impact of institutional ownership on 
Tobin’s Q was greatly reduced. This implies that monitoring is enhanced 
surrounding more institutional investors rather than more committed ones. 
Analogous to the findings from Han (2006), I find that more leveraged REITs 
have lower firm value. There are several explanations to this finding. Firstly, as 
highlighted by Howe and Shilling (1988), REITs are at a disadvantaged from 
undertaking more debt due to the lack of tax savings from undertaking higher debt. 
Another reason as highlighted by Han (2006) is that real estate market is more 
cyclical which mean that REITs have comparatively higher risk of bankruptcy 
than other firms when they hold more debt. 
Consistent with earlier findings, I report that older and smaller REITs have 
higher Tobin’s Q. Profitability matters as REITs with higher net income to 
revenue ratio (NI/REV) is more highly valued by the market. Contrary to 
expectations, Tobin’s Q does not capture future growth opportunities as REITs 




4.6 Sources of incentive alignment effects 
 
The empirical findings verify the incentive alignment effects between 
sponsor shareholdings and REIT firm value and indicate that such effects can vary 
across different sponsor types. To shed light on how sponsor type and sponsor 
shareholdings can influence performance, I perform descriptive statistics for 
financial ratios that reflect the level of financing activities, the operational 
efficiency and the investment opportunities available to the REITs. Results, 
stratified according to sponsor type and sponsor ownership levels, are detailed in 
Table 13. 
[Table 13] 
The findings from Table 13 clearly shows that bank-sponsored REITs 
benefit from their banking relationship as they pay less interest for their debt as 
evidenced by the lower interest expense scaled by the total debt when compared 
to developer and non-bank, non-developer sponsors. Lower interest expense is 
paid by bank-sponsored REITs despite the larger proportion of long term debts in 
their capital structure. Lower short term debt ratios also highlight that these bank-
sponsored REITs are more able to refinancing their maturing debts when 
compared to other types of sponsored REITs.  Consistent with Capozza and 
Seguin (2003), I observe that REITs with higher sponsor shareholdings reduce 
their exposure to leverage risk by holding less debt. 
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Developer sponsored REITs, on the other hand, benefit from higher 
operational efficiency. Better operating efficiency probably stems from the real 
estate expertise from their developer sponsors. While salaries for REIT managers 
increase with developer sponsor shareholdings, indicating possible entrenchment 
effects, developer sponsored REITs enjoy better operating margin as their 
operating expense (operating income) scaled by total assets is lower (higher) than 
other types of sponsored REITs. Amongst the different types of sponsored REITs, 
non-bank and non-developer sponsored REITs have the worst operating 
efficiency. 
Contrary to my predictions, developer sponsored REITs do not enjoy 
better investment opportunities as compared to bank sponsored REITs or non-
bank and non-developer sponsored REITs. In fact, bank sponsored REITs enjoyed 
the fastest growth when I use the change of property, plant and equipment as a 
proxy for increase in real estate investments.  
Overall, the results highlight that bank sponsored REITs are more highly 
valued by the market due to the favorable financing arrangements or investment 
opportunities available to them. Developer sponsored REITs have higher Tobin’s 
Q due to their operating efficiency that could stem from real estate expertise from 
their developer sponsors. Finally, non-bank and non-developer sponsors clearly 
underperformed in terms of financing, investment and operations, explaining why 
they have lower market valuations when compared to their counterparts.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
With the evolution of the management structure in modern corporations 
leading to separation of ownership from management, the issue of how 
governance alleviate agency problems has received considerable attention in the 
finance literature. Yet, due to data unavailability, studies in the Asian REIT 
context are limited despite the rampancy of expropriation in Asian REITs as 
documented in CFA (2011). Weak governance structures, entrenched ownership, 
unique management structure and lack of hostile takeover threats are some 
reasons why sponsors are so influential over their REITs and may possibly 
explain these expropriations.  
On this notion, this study has two main objectives. First, this study 
attempts to empirically identify the important determinants of sponsor holdings in 
Asian REITs. Second, this study attempts to empirical test the effectiveness of 
ownership and governance structures in ameliorating or exacerbating agency 
problems in Asian REITs.  
Empirically, I find that the characteristics of sponsors influence the 
retention of holdings by Sponsors post IPO. In particular, the type of sponsors 
matter as developer sponsors and those financially strong sponsors (Bank_SP and 
GLC) tend to hold more REIT shares. While higher developer holdings may be 
attributed to the desire to influence REIT investment decisions, the compatibility 
of the risk and return of REITs with government linked companies’ investment 
requirements could explain their high exposure to REITs. More reputable 
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sponsors as proxy by age also tend to retain larger shareholdings of their REIT. 
The stronger presence of alternate governance mechanisms is negatively 
correlated with sponsor holdings. This finding is consistent with the fact that 
stronger monitoring from such mechanism can mitigate agency problems, thus 
reducing the optimal sponsor holdings. 
Surrounding the second research objective, the findings repeatedly 
confirm that REIT ownership structure influences REIT valuation across different 
specifications and estimation methods. Unlike the findings in US REITs that 
documented a non-linear relationship between managerial holdings and firm value, 
the relationship between Asian sponsor holdings and firm value is strictly linear 
across specifications, with strong incentive alignment effects documented when 
sponsor holdings are low from between 0 to 5%. Alternate governance 
mechanisms appear to enhance monitoring of sponsors. REITs with stronger 
monitoring institutional investors and board of directors are more highly valued 
by the market.  
Motivated by the fact that sponsor holdings and REIT firm value may be 
endogenously determined, estimations are conducted using GMM to obtain more 
consistent estimates and robust standard errors. Incentive alignment effects at low 
levels of sponsor holdings remain robust after controlling for endogeneity. Post 
estimation test statistic affirms the choice of instruments and dismisses the 
concern of simultaneity between sponsor ownership and REIT firm value.  
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In addition, I conduct multivariate regressions stratified according to the 
sponsor type (classified according to developer, bank and other sponsors) using 
OLS to examine whether the relationship between sponsor holdings and REIT 
firm value is different for different sponsors. Notably, incentive alignment effects 
are considerably larger surrounding developer sponsors while it is negligible for 
non-bank and non-developer sponsors unless sponsors hold large holdings of 
beyond 25%. Such wealth creation effects could be attributed real estate expertise 
from developer sponsors, enhancing operating efficiency for REITs or provision 
of more growth opportunities. Similar alignment effects are observed for a sample 
of bank sponsored REITs, affirming the tangible financial benefits received by 
these REITs that lead to higher firm valuation.  
Upon controlling for the sponsor related characteristics, I find the 
effectiveness of the alternate governance mechanisms in enhancing Tobin’s Q is 
nullified with the exception of institutional ownership. However, the robustness 
specification reveals that it is not how committed the institutional owners (as 
captured by institutional holdings) are but rather the presence of more institutional 
investors that is critical to REIT firm value. A comparison of various financial 
ratios stratified according to sponsor type and ownership levels reveal that bank 
and developer sponsors confer financing and operational benefits respectively to 
their REITs, leading to higher firm valuation. 
This study shed important light on the relationship between sponsors and 
their REITs. This structure is uniquely found in Asian REITs and is starkly 
different from US REITs, warranting a study on the Asian context. Findings from 
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our study dispel concerns that sponsors are exploiting the REIT structure at the 
expense of minority shareholders. Higher valuation surrounding REITs with 
higher sponsor shareholdings supports that ownership of REIT shareholdings 
align the interest of sponsors with the minority shareholders, mitigating possible 
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Table 1: Cases of wealth expropriation in Asian REITs 
REIT Name Country Type of Expropriation Details Outcome
Fortune REIT Hong Kong RPTs
Fortune REIT proposed an acquisition of 3 properties from their sponsor, Cheung Kong. Fortune
REIT plan to fund this acquisition by a rights issue of HKD 1.9billion. At the point of acquisition,
Cheung Kong is a significant shareholder of Fortune REIT holding almost 40% of the shares. The
proposed transaction is unfavorable for Fortune REIT, as the net asset value per share will fall from
$7.5 to $4.8 and the distribution yield from 9% to 7.2%. Fortune REIT is overpaying for these
acquisitions as the non-prime properties are valued at over-optimistic yields that are comparable to
prime properties.
On the day of acquisition, Fortune REIT lost
about 10% of their share value due to
excessive dumping of shares by investors
FC Residential Investment Corporation Japan Financing
FC Residential REIT announce that it will acquire properties from their sponsors, Ichigo group and
intend to finance the acquisitions via private placements. Units will be issued into a special purpose
vehicle affiliated to the sponsor at a price of 180,000 yen, which is approximately 25% below the
closing traded price and 61% discount to their book value. This transaction will make the sponsor the
biggest shareholder while diluting the interest of exisiting shareholders.
Several investors request for an injunction to
suspend the proposed property transaction that
is highly disadvantageous to existing
shareholders. The REIT is force to suspend
this transaction.
Keppeland REIT Singapore RPTs
K-REIT proposed to sell Keppel Towers and GE Towers at $573 million to their sponsor,Keppel
Land while using those proceeds to purchase 87.5% stake of Ocean Financial Center at $2.01 billion
from Keppel Land. Questions are raised on the price paid by K-REIT for the acquisition of Ocean
Financial Center as it is very much overvalued as compared to recent transacted prices. 
K-REIT lost approximately 10% of its share
value on the day of announcing the asset swap
Mori Hills REIT Japan RPTs and Financing
Mori Hills REIT announce that they will acquire two properties from their sponsor, Mori Hill Building
Co. and sell one of the properties back to their sponsor. This acquisition will be funded by private
placement, in which sponsor will receive new units at 500,000 yen. This offering price is
approximately 33% lower than IPO price and 13% discount from book value per share. In addition,
Mori Hill is overpaying for the RPT as the transaction price is much higher than the appraised value.
As a result from this transaction, sponsor ownership will increase from 15% to 30%.
Mori Hill REIT managed to execute the
transaction without investors intervention. The
management indicate that the distribution per
unit will not be affected with optimistic rental
projections
Macarthurcook REIT Singapore Financing 
Macarthurcook Investment REIT (MI-REIT) faced difficulties to refinance their expiring debts due
to the subprime credit crisis in 2009. Around the same time, AIMS financial group acquired
Macarthurcook Group (MI-REIT's sponsor). Cambridge Industrial Trust (CIT) proposed for the
acquisition of MI-REIT to bail them out from their refinancing crisis. However, AIMS Financial
Group (the sponsor now) are reluctant to sell to CIT and instead choose to recapitalized. New
shareunits raised from the recapitalization will constitute 85% of the total units outstanding.
Severe dillution of the share value of exisiting
unitholders because of the reluctance of
sponsors to divest the REIT. The
recapitalization caused the share price to
decline by more than 50%. Shareholders have





Figure 1: Typical management structure in Asian REITs 
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Table 2: Regulatory framework for Asian REITs 
 
Hong Kong Japan Singapore Malaysia
Mandatory takeovers
Takeover is triggered if a party owns more than 
30% of the voting rights or owns 30% but not more 
than 50% of the voting rights and has acquired more 
than 2% of the voting rights within a twelve month 
period.
Takeover requires the adoption of a resolution at the 
unitholder's meeting by a super majority vote of 
more than 2/3 of the votes, on the condition that 
these 2/3 votes represent more than half of the total 
shares outstanding at the meeting.
Takeover is triggered if a party owns more than 
30% of the voting rights or owns 30% but not more 
than 50% of the voting rights and has acquired more 
than 1% of the voting rights within a six month 
period.
Takeover is triggered if a party owns more than 
33% but less than 50% of the voting rights and has 
acquired more than 2% of the units within a six 
month period
RPTs (Related Party 
Transactions)
Unitholder approval is required if the transaction is 
equal or greater than 5% of the NAV. Interested 
parties are not allowed to vote.
J-REITs are required to disclose the details of the 
RPTs, which include price, date, reason for 
acquisition or disposale and reason for determining 
the price is fair and reasonable. Neither independent 
unitholders nor the board of the REIT is required to 
approve RPTs
Unitholder's approval is required if the transaction is 
equal or greater than 5% of the NAV. Interested 
parties are not allowed to vote. In addition, two 
independent valuations are required to determine the 
transaction price for RPTs. Acquisition price should 
not be higher than the higher of two valuations. 
Disposal price should not be lower than the lower of 
the two valuations. Adequate disclosure must be 
provided on the identity of related parties, details on 
the assets, transacted price and valuation and other 
relevant matters. 
Unitholder's approval is required when transaction 
value is equal or greater than 5% of the NAV. 
Interested parties are not allowed to vote. 
Acquisition price must not be exceed 110% of the 
value stated in valuation report while disposal price 
must not be less than 90% of the value stated in 
valuation report.
Board structure
Not required to have boards unless they are 
internally managed. Unitholders have no power to 
nominate, appoint or remove directors. Nomination 
and removal is up to the discretion of shareholders 
of the REIT manager and board.
Minimum requirement of a board size of 3, which is 
made up of two supervisory (Independent) directors 
and one executive director. Boards must be elected 
by the shareholders in the general unitholder's 
meeting.
At least two independent members in the board, with 
at least 1/3 of the boards made up of independent 
directors.  Directors are nominated by the 
nominating committee of the board.
At least two independent members in the board, with 
at least 1/3 of the boards made up of independent 
directors. 
Asset restrictions 100% real estate 70% real estate 75% real estate
50% real estate; non-real estate must not exceed 
25%
Property development Not allowed Not allowed
Not allowed unless intended to hold property upon 
completion. Development size must be less than 
10% of property portfolio value.
Not allowed
Management structure Internal/External External External External
Removal of managers
Approval by ordinary resolution, requires the 
majority of votes. Managers and related associates 
are allowed to vote
Approval by ordinary resolution, requires the 
majority of votes. 
Approval by ordinary resolution, requires the 
majority of votes. Managers and related associates 
are not allowed to vote
Approval by ordinary resolution, requires the 
majority of votes. Managers and related associates 






Figure 3: Bi-variate relationship of Sponsor ownership with corporate governance 
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Tobin's Q Market value of equity plus market value of preferred stock plus book value of liabilities divided by the book value of total assets
SPOWN Total common equity held by Sponsors as a fraction of total common equity outstanding
SPOWN_SQ Square of SPOWN
SPOWN_0to5 Equals SPOWN if 0.00<SPOWN<0.05; 0.05 if SPOWN>=0.05
SPOWN_5to25 Equals SPOWN-0.05 if 0.05<SPOWN<0.25; 0 if SPOWN<=0.05; 0.20 if SPOWN>=0.25
SPOWN_25abv Equals SPOWN-0.25 if 0.25<SPOWN<1.00; 0 if SPOWN<=0.25
INSTIOWN Total common equity held by Institutional Investors
NoINSTIOWN Natural logarithm of the number of Institutional Investors
BLOCKOWN Total common equity held by external shareholders with shareholdings of more than 5%
OUTBOD Percentage of Outside directors expressed as a fraction of total board size
BODSize Natural logarithm of the size of board
Dev_SP Dummy variable equal to one if main Sponsor is a developer
Bank_SP Dummy variable equal to one if main Sponsor is a bank
GLC_SP Dummy variable equal to one if Sponsor is a government linked 
SPAge Natural logarithm of the Sponsor Age (calculated from founding date)
SPList Dummy variable equal to one if Sponsor is listed in stock exchange
LN_Spinoffs Natural logarithm of the total number of spinoffs by Sponsor
REITAge Duration from IPO dates (in years)
NI_REV Ratio of operating income to total revenue
Size Natural logarithm of the market capitalization
Sigma Annualized standard deviation of stock return calculated using past one year trading data
Leverage Book value of debt divided by book value of asset
AssetGrowth Change in the size of the total asset from time t+1
Japan Dummy variable equal to one if the country of domicile is Japan
Singapore Dummy variable equal to one if the country of domicile is Singapore
Malaysia Dummy variable equal to one if the country of domicile is Malaysia
 
Table 3: Variable description 
 
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Sponsor Characteristics
SPOWN 0.24 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.28 0.12 0.53 0.17 0.30 0.15
Dev_SP 0.68 0.47 0.55 0.50 0.85 0.36 0.81 0.40 0.77 0.43
Bank_SP 0.24 0.43 0.38 0.49 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.42
LN_Spinoffs 1.76 1.17 1.50 0.75 2.43 1.53 1.63 1.35 1.42 0.98
GLC_SP 0.15 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.50 0.10 0.31 0.13 0.34
SPList 0.77 0.42 0.90 0.30 0.68 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.70 0.46
SPAge 48.24 37.52 56.05 35.26 34.44 33.03 45.15 52.24 46.71 34.69
Alternate Governance
BLOCKOWN 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.21
INSTIOWN 0.28 0.17 0.30 0.15 0.30 0.18 0.12 0.10 0.24 0.20
BODSize 5.42 2.35 3.64 1.03 7.72 1.42 6.44 1.38 7.87 2.02
OUTBOD 0.57 0.14 0.67 0.05 0.47 0.13 0.40 0.07 0.46 0.10
Leverage 0.43 0.14 0.49 0.13 0.36 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.38 0.08
Firm Characteristics
Tobin's Q 0.98 0.37 1.04 0.43 0.91 0.23 0.98 0.15 0.83 0.38
Size (USD million) 2602.86 5936.04 2180.45 1853.90 4231.64 10734.14 218.89 138.19 2511.35 2489.81
Sigma 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.09
NI_REV 0.66 2.11 0.62 2.08 0.75 2.76 0.71 0.14 0.64 0.42
REITAge 3.90 2.26 4.38 2.34 3.81 2.09 2.51 1.67 2.72 1.68
Number of Obs 774 417 212 68 77
Full Sample Japan Singapore Malaysia Hong Kong
 















Developer SP 524 27.5% 0.0073 0.97 0.0167
Non-Developer SP 250 15.7% 0.0079 0.98 0.0218
Bank SP 184 14.5% 0.0066 1.04 0.0257
Non-Bank SP 590 26.6% 0.0071 0.96 0.0154
Others SP 66 19.2% 0.0233 0.81 0.0329
Dev & Bank SP 708 24.1% 0.0061 0.99 0.0141
GLC 115 32.3% 0.0121 0.99 0.0198
Non-GLC SP 659 22.2% 0.0065 0.98 0.0153
The table above illustrates the average sponsor ownership and the average Tobin's Q for sample of REITs stratified according to the
types of sponsors (Developers, Banks, Others & Government-linked sponsors) backing them. Paired T-test is conducted between the
stratified groups to observe if sponsor stock holdings and REIT firm value is significantly different between the different groups. T-
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Figure 4: Bi-variate relationship of Tobin’s Q with Sponsor ownership and 




Table 6: Correlation matrix
SPOwn BLOCKOwn BODSIZE OUTBOD INSTIOwn REITAge SPAge Size Sigma Lev Tobin's Q NI/REV DevSP NumSpin GLC SPList VIF
SPOwn 1.000 1.79
BLOCKOwn -0.303 1.000 1.43
BODSIZE -0.267 0.133 1.000 2.25
OUTBOD -0.138 -0.030 -0.068 1.000 1.53
INSTIOwn -0.293 0.319 0.456 0.083 1.000 1.92
REITAge -0.121 -0.132 0.187 0.031 0.127 1.000 1.41
SPAge 0.167 -0.131 -0.208 -0.065 -0.225 0.003 1.000 1.94
Size -0.354 0.047 0.502 0.093 0.392 0.353 -0.045 1.000 2.04
Sigma -0.107 0.087 0.025 0.035 0.016 -0.127 -0.214 0.139 1.000 1.32
Lev -0.308 0.058 0.342 0.016 0.022 0.134 -0.341 0.276 0.218 1.000 1.52
Tobin's Q 0.148 -0.104 0.073 0.049 0.121 -0.161 -0.225 -0.166 -0.185 0.074 1.000 1.6
NI/REV 0.067 -0.282 0.011 -0.028 -0.063 0.013 -0.083 0.148 0.114 0.083 0.166 1.000 1.22
DevSP -0.094 0.168 -0.019 -0.062 0.063 0.014 0.166 0.067 0.071 -0.056 -0.056 0.000 1.000 1.3
NumSpin 0.030 -0.057 -0.098 -0.062 -0.039 0.119 -0.148 0.054 0.157 0.044 0.170 0.069 0.310 1.000 1.4
GLC -0.016 0.057 0.474 0.318 0.444 0.160 -0.431 0.282 0.114 0.229 0.262 0.036 -0.023 -0.013 1.000 2.52




Sample Combined Hong Kong Japan Malaysia
Sponsor
Dev_SP 0.095 *** - 0.104 *** -0.341 *** -0.031
(6.57) - (7.40) (-3.51) (-1.12)
Bank_SP 0.053 *** 0.018 0.080 *** - -0.076
(3.24) (0.32) (5.09) - (-1.63)
GLC_SP 0.104 *** -0.505 *** - -0.122 0.138 ***
(6.18) (-4.06) - (-1.19) (6.69)
SPList -0.002 -0.430 *** -0.091 *** 0.025 0.001
(-0.11) (-7.40) (-3.55) (0.42) (0.04)
SPAge 0.018 *** 0.009 0.002 -0.016 0.075 ***
(4.89) (0.09) (0.49) (-0.48) (7.60)
LN_Spinoffs -0.034 *** -0.168 *** -0.031 * 0.056 0.023
(-3.27) (-3.42) (-1.83) (0.90) (1.29)
Alternate Gov
INSTIOWN -0.135 *** -0.030 -0.650 *** -0.979 *** 0.044
(-3.97) (-0.70) (-8.00) (-4.78) (0.86)
BLOCKOWN -0.189 *** -0.012 0.358 *** -0.448 -0.172 ***
(-4.37) (-0.14) (3.76) (-1.36) (-2.76)
BODSize -0.035 * -0.171 -0.072 *** 0.031 0.100 *
(-1.92) (-1.58) (-3.53) (0.58) (1.77)
OUTBOD -0.109 ** -0.440 ** -0.291 *** -0.197 0.192 ***
(-2.09) (-2.51) (-3.94) (-0.99) (2.69)
Leverage -0.074 * 0.199 -0.080 -0.529 *** 0.008
(-1.91) (1.22) (-2.23) (-3.08) (0.10)
Firm
REITAge -0.045 *** -0.040 ** -0.061 *** 0.098 *** -0.010
(-4.36) (-2.52) (-4.20) (3.36) (-0.70)
Tobin's Q 0.019 * 0.084 *** 0.034 *** -0.138 0.079
(1.83) (4.08) (3.13) (-2.16) (1.63)
NI/REV 0.001 -0.016 0.002 -0.028 -0.000
(0.55) (-0.99) (1.20) (-0.39) (-0.30)
Size 0.016 ** 0.087 *** 0.062 *** 0.162 *** -0.017
(2.52) (4.48) (4.86) (3.72) (-1.51)
Sigma 0.143 -1.564 *** 0.588 2.228 -0.190
(1.12) (-4.59) (1.05) (1.48) (-0.32)
Japan -0.074 ** - - - -
(-2.49) - - - -
Malaysia 0.241 *** - - - -
(7.93) - - - -
Singapore 0.004 - - - -
(0.17) - - - -
Sector Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 752 70 403 68 211
Adj R-Squared 0.59 0.96 0.47 0.94 0.71
Dependent Variable: SPOWN
Singapore
The table above reports the cross sectional regression results to identify the determinants for Sponsor ownership. Sample is
further stratified on a country level (Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia and Singapore ). For Hong Kong REITs, there are only
developer and bank sponsors. For Japan REITs, there are no GLC sponsors. For Malaysia, there are no bank sponsored
REITs. Sector dummies (Industrial, Hotel, Retail, Residential, Office and Diversified sector controls ) and time dummies are
also included in each estimation but are not reported. Other independent variables are defined in Table 2. T-statistics reported
in parenthesis. *,** and *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.




Linear Quadratic Piecewise 
Sponsor
SPOWN 0.192 ** 0.599 ** -
(2.48) (2.22) -
SPOWNsq - -0.683 -
- (-1.47) -
SPOWN_0to5 - - 5.98 ***
- - (3.70)
SPOWN_5to25 - - 0.038
- - (0.17)
SPOWN_25abv - - 0.032
- - (0.17)
Alternate Gov
INSTIOWN 0.379 *** 0.385 *** 0.413 ***
(3.27) (3.28) (3.39)
BLOCKOWN 0.101 0.098 0.080
(0.46) (0.44) (0.37)
OUTBOD 0.086 * 0.087 * 0.205 **
(1.73) (1.74) (1.90)
BODSize 0.25 ** 0.232 ** 0.087* **
(2.46) (2.15) (1.80)
Leverage 0.286 0.262 0.275
(0.78) (0.68) (0.73)
Firm
REITAge 0.099 *** 0.103 *** 0.099 ***
(4.21) (4.35) (4.27)
NI/REV 0.006 ** 0.005 * 0.004 **
(2.22) (1.90) (1.39)
Size -0.121 *** -0.118 *** -0.120 ***
(-3.03) (-3.00) (-3.06)
Sigma 0.171 0.082 0.076
(0.28) (0.13) (0.12)
Japan 0.130 0.130 0.122
(1.54) (1.52) (1.43)
Malaysia -0.070 -0.038 -0.030
(-0.62) (-0.35) (-0.28)
Singapore 0.050 0.036 0.044
(1.07) (0.73) (0.90)
Constant 1.136 *** 1.104 *** 0.896 ***
(2.73) (2.71) (2.45)
Sector Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 752 752 752
Adj R-Squared 0.27 0.27 0.25
Tobin's Q
The table above reports the cross sectional regression results
between Tobin's Q and Sponsor ownership. A total of 3
specifications (Linear, Quadratic and Piecewise Linear) are
estimated using OLS. Sector dummies (Industrial, Hotel, Retail,
Residential, Office and Diversified sector controls) and time
dummies are also included in each estimation but are not reported.
Other independent variables are defined in Table 2. T-statistics
reported in parenthesis. *,** and *** denotes significance at 10%,
5% and 1% respectively.  






SPOWN 0.615 * 6.606 ** -
(1.78) (1.98) -
SPOWNsq - -10.783 * -
- (-1.79) -
SPOWN_0to5 - - 12.016
- - (0.53)
SPOWN_5to25 - - 2.211
- - (0.60)
SPOWN_25abv - - -1.936
- - (-0.80)
Alternate Gov
INSTIOWN 0.319 * 0.518 ** 0.523 **
(1.94) (1.96) (2.15)
BLOCKOWN 0.240 -0.007 0.051
(1.37) (-0.02) (0.18)
OUTBOD 0.445 *** -0.027 0.117
(3.03) (-0.08) (0.44)
BODSize 0.134 0.103 0.059
(1.18) (0.89) (0.49)
Leverage 0.294 -0.391 -0.129
(0.85) (-0.62) (-0.17)
Firm
REITAge 0.091 *** 0.176 *** 0.125 ***
(2.60) (3.10) (2.38)
NI/REV 0.005 -0.006 -0.005
(1.25) (-0.89) (-0.88)
Size -0.104 *** -0.127 ** -0.120 **
(-2.65) (-2.45) (-2.42)
Sigma -0.053 -1.543 -0.572
(-0.07) (-1.04) (-0.49)
Japan 0.167 0.182 0.124
(1.30) (0.95) (0.63)
Malaysia -0.121 0.412 0.279
(-0.83) (1.36) (1.11)
Singapore 0.036 -0.171 -0.023
(0.50) (-0.90) (-0.13)
Sector Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 752 752 752
Adj R-Squared 0.213 -0.391 0.026
Pagan-Hall Test Chi-sq(1) P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
DWH Test Chi-sq (1) P Value 0.310 0.040 0.229
Hansen J stat Chi-sq (4) P Value 0.039 0.490 0.250
Anderson Rubin Wald Test Chi-sq (5) P Value 0.019 0.019 0.019
The table above reports the regression results between Tobin's Q and Sponsor ownership using GMM
(Generalized method of moments). A total of 2 specifications (Linear and Piecewise Linear) is estimated.
Instruments for GMM include a vector of sponsor related characteristics (Dev_SP, Bank_SP, GLC_SP,
SPAge and LN_Spinoffs ). Sector dummies (Industrial, Hotel, Retail, Residential, Office and Diversified
sector controls) and time dummies are also included in each estimation but are not reported. Other
independent variables are defined in Table 2. T-statistics reported in parenthesis. *,** and *** denotes
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. P value for (1) Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test (test whether
ownership is endogeneous) (2) Hansen J P value (test whether instruments are valid) (3)Anderson Rubin
Wald test P value (test whether instruments are weak)
GMM
 




Hong Kong Japan Malaysia Singapore
Sponsor
SPOWN_0to5 5.091 6.892 *** -5.798 * 3.051 **
(1.03) (3.89) (-1.90) (2.27)
SPOWN_5to25 -3.351 0.926 *** 0.914 0.196
(-0.71) (3.07) (1.20) (0.67)
SPOWN_25abv 3.047 * -0.208 -0.822 *** 0.351 ***
(1.75) (-0.51) (-2.96) (1.93)
Alternate Gov
INSTIOWN 0.561 2.669 *** -0.883 ** 0.182 ***
(1.32) (4.29) (-2.32) (2.40)
BLOCKOWN 0.921 -2.079 *** 0.829 -0.133
(1.07) (-3.00) (1.31) (-1.05)
OUTBOD 2.680 -0.479 -0.535 0.119 *
(1.14) (-1.46) (-1.31) (1.09)
BODSize 1.563 ** 0.110 -0.047 0.122
(2.27) (1.55) (-0.38) (1.53)
Leverage 3.666 0.416 -0.206 1.052 ***
(1.60) (1.02) (-0.89) (7.25)
Firm
REITAge -0.161 0.184 *** 0.131 * 0.048 *
(-1.37) (4.30) (1.82) (1.94)
NI/REV -0.138 0.002 -0.083 0.001
(-1.06) (0.43) (-0.58) (0.90)
Size -0.542 * -0.411 *** 0.059 -0.041 ***
(-1.81) (-3.75) (0.81) (-3.45)
Sigma 2.856 -1.915 2.468 -3.819 **
(1.26) (-1.02) (0.83) (-2.44)
Sector Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 70 403 68 211
Adj R-Squared 0.248 0.361 0.445 0.638
The table above illustrates the cross sectional regression results between Tobin's Q and Sponsor
ownership after stratify our sample according to the country level (Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia and
Singapore). The observation size is 70, 403, 68 and 211 for REITs in Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia
and Singapore respectively. Other independent variables are defined in Table 2. Sector dummies
(Industrial, Hotel, Retail, Residential, Office and Diversified sector controls) and time dummies are
also included in each estimation but are not reported.T-statistics reported in parenthesis. *,** and ***
denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Tobin's Q - Country Stratified
 




Combined Bank Developer Others
Sponsor
SPOWN_0to5 5.809 *** 4.137 ** 7.531 ** -0.249
(3.59) (2.05) (2.48) (-0.10)
SPOWN_5to25 -0.042 -0.115 -0.259 1.206
(-0.24) (-0.22) (-0.84) (1.23)
SPOWN_25abv -0.071 -0.511 0.315 1.723 ***
(-0.35) (-0.77) (1.43) (4.00)
Dev_SP 0.059 - - -
(1.57) - - -
Bank_SP 0.069 ** - - -
(2.16) - - -
GLC_SP -0.005 2.39 *** -0.064 0.110
(-0.14) (2.68) (-1.15) (0.26)
SPList -0.086 *** 0.515 *** -0.083 ** -0.158
(-3.30) (3.04) (-2.06) (-0.69)
SPAge -0.009 -0.034 * -0.033 0.059
(-0.72) (-1.70) (-1.33) (1.27)
LN_Spinoffs 0.098 *** 0.428 *** 0.096 *** -
(4.56) (3.38) (3.35) -
Alternate Gov
INSTIOWN 0.383 *** 0.502 0.366 ** 0.270
(3.63) (1.36) (2.30) (1.16)
BLOCKOWN 0.168 -0.076 0.043 0.133
(0.79) (-0.21) (0.21) (0.69)
OUTBOD 0.314 *** 0.710 0.082 0.332
(3.34) (1.47) (0.51) (0.56)
BODSize -0.016 0.072 0.030 -0.260
(-0.37) (0.76) (0.44) (-1.02)
Leverage 0.282 0.196 0.070 1.212 ***
(0.81) (0.90) (0.12) (3.28)
Firm
REITAge 0.098 *** 0.206 *** 0.098 *** -0.141
(4.89) (2.62) (3.11) (-1.40)
NI/REV 0.003 -0.006 0.011 * -0.007
(0.95) (-1.23) (1.79) (-0.37)
Size -0.109 *** -0.330 ** -0.172 *** -0.031
(-3.49) (-2.23) (-2.98) (-0.52)
Sigma 0.149 8.473 ** -0.502 1.755
(0.24) (2.02) (-1.20) (1.08)
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 752 176 511 65
Adj R-Squared 0.267 0.597 0.232 0.837
The table above illustrates the estimation results between Sponsor ownership and Tobin's Q
after controlling for Sponsor specific characteristics. We further stratify our sample according
to the Sponsor type (Bank , Developer and Others ). We do not observe that Other  Sponsors 
spin off more than 1 REIT from our observations. The total number of observations is 752 and
upon stratification there are 176, 511 and 65 observations for Bank sponsors, Developer 
sponsors and Other sponsors respectively. Other independent variables are defined in Table
2. Sector dummies (Industrial, Hotel, Retail, Residential, Office and Diversified sector
controls), time dummies and country controls (Singapore, Malaysia and Japan) are also
included in each estimation but are not reported. T-statistics reported in parenthesis. *,** and
*** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Tobin's Q - Sponsor type stratified
 




Table 12: Robustness Test 
Variables
Lead Tobin's Q Yearly Tobin's Q
Sponsor





















NoINSTIOWN 0.003 *** 0.113 **
(3.53) (2.44)






Leverage -0.523 * -0.077
(-1.67) (-0.17)
Firm
REITAge 0.089 *** 0.084 ***
(3.06) (2.64)
NI/REV 0.004 * 0.003
(1.76) (0.87)




AssetGrowth 0.000 0.000 *
(1.42) (-1.66)
Country Controls Yes Yes
Sector Controls Yes Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes
Observations 633 363
Adj R-Squared 0.329 0.412
Combined Sample
The table above illustrates the estimation results of our robustness
test. In our robustness test, we use two alternate dependent
variables, Lead Tobin's Q (Tobin's Q for a REIT at time = t+1 (half
a year later)) and Yearly Tobin's Q (the average of the bi-annual
Tobin's Q). We further remove any REITs with less than 3 years of
observations. Two additional control variables are added which
include NoINSTIOWN which is the natural logarithm of the total
number of institutional investors and FutAssetGrowth which is the
change in total asset in t+1. The total number of observations for
the two estimations are 633 and 363 respectively. Other
independent variables are defined in Table 2. T-statistics reported






Variables 0% to 5% 5% to 25% 25% onwards Total 0% to 5% 5% to 25% 25% onwards Total 0% to 5% 5% to 25% 25% onwards Total
Financing
Interest Expense/Total Debt 2.49% 2.45% 2.46% 2.45% 3.50% 2.73% 4.56% 3.51% 2.61% 4.77% 3.07% 3.94%
Short Term Debt/Total Assets 14.81% 8.97% 17.14% 10.49% 17.10% 11.59% 9.64% 11.21% 12.96% 15.66% 15.63% 15.08%
Long Term Debt/Total Assets 28.94% 28.47% 23.63% 27.94% 22.64% 27.96% 20.08% 24.12% 28.98% 22.95% 15.47% 22.37%
Total Debt/Total Assets 43.75% 37.44% 40.77% 38.43% 39.73% 39.55% 29.72% 35.33% 41.94% 38.62% 31.10% 37.45%
Operations
Salary Expense/Total Assets 0.04% 0.04% 0.01% 0.03% 0.01% 0.11% 0.06% 0.09% 0.01% 0.04% 0.01% 0.03%
Operating Expense/Total Assets 4.19% 4.29% 4.62% 4.32% 3.88% 4.09% 3.07% 3.56% 5.09% 5.83% 2.21% 4.51%
Operating Income/Total Assets 2.59% 2.89% 2.82% 2.85% 2.29% 2.72% 3.33% 2.95% 2.14% 2.46% 3.90% 2.75%
Investment
Investment expenses/ Total Assets 83.44% 65.62% 53.11% 65.83% 55.00% 53.42% 28.19% 42.68% 43.33% 33.13% 44.90% 38.26%
Asset Growth -9.68% 20.61% 22.25% 17.93% 3.31% 12.63% 8.04% 9.87% 12.22% -0.17% 15.13% 5.72%
Bank Sponsor Developer Sponsor Other Sponsor
The table above illustrates the mean ratios illustrating financing activities, operational efficiency and investment opportunities avaliable for different REITs stratified according to the type of sponsor
(banks, developer and others) and according to the sponsor equity holdings (0% to 5%, 5% to 25% and 25% onwards).
 
Table 13: Sponsor type, sponsor ownership and various financial ratios 
